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Abstract
Risk and return management is one of the core competencies of venture capital companies 
(VCCs) as they invest in young, innovative firms with a high return potential, but also high risk 
potential. Due to the liability of smallness, newness and financial constraints young, innovative 
firms are constantly under the threat of failure. In the scope of this dissertation are four rela-
ted studies – three empirical studies and one literature review – analyzing the risk and return 
management of VCCs. In particular, risk assessment and risk management and value adding ac-
tivities in the post investment phase were examined. In the first article, authors analyze which 
risks are relevant over the whole venture capital (VC) investment process and show how VCCs as-
sess and documents risks in their deal documents. The second article studies risk management 
practices of VCCs. We show that the experience and the skills of the corresponding investment 
manager have a significantly negative impact on the failure risk of a venture. Article three analy-
zes value creation measures applied by VCCs. The results suggest that VCCs are highly engaged 
in supporting ventures in financial and human capital issues as well as in establishing strong 
governance mechanisms. The fourth article also deals with the foregone topic. This paper pro-
vides a literature analysis on value adding activity measures in VC investments, synthesizes the 
variables measuring the main levers of value adding and identifies directions for improvement 
in terms of data, variables and methods.
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1. Introduction 
“Capital as such is not evil; it is its wrong use that is evil. Capital in some form or 
other will always be needed.” 
- Mahatma Gandhi -  
Young entrepreneurial firms operating in the high-tech field (NTBFs – new 
technology based firms) are a relevant driver for the development and 
commercialization of new technologies, for employment creation, or more generally 
speaking, for growth and competitiveness of economies (Audretsch, 1995; Colombo, 
Luukkonen, Mustar, & Wright, 2010). However, NTBFs like all start-ups are 
associated with several drawbacks compared to their more established counterparts. 
NTBFs face the challenges of smallness, newness and limited access to capital often 
engendering a shorter expected life and a greater risk of failure of NTBFs (Ang, 1992; 
Coleman, 2004). The lack of sufficient resources hinders the development of NTBFs 
and markedly affects negatively social and economic welfare. A major financing 
source for NTBFs and other start-ups is VC. Academics, politicians and practitioners 
agree that VC can mitigate the problems of NTBFs. Hence, it can be highly 
advantageous for NTBFs. This is especially the case in the early stages of a NTBF’s 
life.  
VC is capital provided by VCCs with the purpose of financing young, entrepreneurial 
ventures with exceptionally high growth expectations. Due to the above mentioned 
drawbacks of newly established firms and high uncertainties arising from information 
asymmetries between VCCs and NTBFs’ founders, VC investments are ranked as a 
high risk asset class (Ellis, Sagiv; & Drori, 2014). The investments in NTBFs have a 
high return, but also high risk potential for VCCs. Risks can be attributed to the 
information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and VCCs. Therefore, VCCs are 
actively involved in their portfolio firms to mitigate risk, but to also increase the return 
performance. Risk and return management varies across the different stages of 
investment process of VCCs (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Investment process of venture capital companies 
Source: Own illustration, following Schefczyk (2006) 
On a portfolio level, VCCs have a certain investment selection strategy in which start-
ups to invest. In that course, VCCs follow a portfolio strategy to diversify the risk for 
their limited partners. The topics of risk diversification and the investment selection 
strategy were adequately analyzed in academic literature (Achtleitner and Nathusius, 
2003; Knill, 2009). In the post-investment phase VCCs pursue risk management and 
value adding activities to manage the risk and return of portfolio companies. If a 
portfolio firm does not develop as expected or has a high risk of failure, VCCs conduct 
several risk assessment and risk management measures reduce or eliminate venture´s 
default risk. VCCs apply various risk management measures such as financial 
contracts, reporting and controlling or stages financing. To achieve abnormal returns 
compared to the market, VCCs perform different value creation measures in their 
portfolio firms, also known as value adding activities. Several empirical studies proved 
that value adding activities can be an important driver of VC-backed firms’ 
performance (Alperovych & Hübner, 2013; Di Guo & Jiang, 2013). In doing so, VCCs 
provide financial, operational, strategic, governance, human capital and support with 
networks (see e.g. Agarwal & Chatterjee, 2007; Cumming et al., 2005; Macmillan et 
al., 1989). The investment process ends with the divesting phase in which a VCC 
intends to find the optimal exit decision. Moderate attention has been paid to the risk 
and return performance and management of venture capital companies (Xu, 2008). 
Nevertheless, there are already some studies that analyze the risk and return 
performance and management of VCCs. Bygrave and Tymmons (1992), Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jorgenson (2000) and Wright and Robbie (1998) conducted descriptive 
3 
statistics. There are also empirical studies examining this topic (see e.g. Cochrane, 
2005; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Xu, 2004 and 2008).  
Due to the sensitivity of internal VC data and restricted publication duties, detailed VC 
information is rare. Hence, there are a number of crucial aspects of VCC´s risk and 
return management that are under-researched, especially in the field of risk assessment 
and risk management (Bygrave, 2006; Neergaard & Ulhoi, 2006). For example, risk 
management, which has received relatively little attention in entrepreneurship 
literature at the micro-level of VC portfolio firms, has been largely unsystematically 
analyzed so far, but it is an important research topic (Manigart, Waele Wright, Robbie, 
Desbrieres, Sapienza & Beekman, 2002; Pinkwart, 2002). Recent studies have already 
investigated the topic of risk and risk management at the micro-level of VC portfolio 
firms and offered valuable insights (see e.g. LiPuma & Park, 2014; Lu, Hwang, & 
Wang, 2006; Smolarski, Verick, Foxen, & Kut, 2005; Tan, Zhang, & Jun, 2008). This 
study aims to continue the analyses and discussion in academic literature on risk and 
return management on a micro-level of VC portfolio firms.  
Germany belongs to the leading European tech countries and gained importance in the 
start-up scene over the last years driven by the key regional tech hubs in Berlin, 
Hamburg and Munich (EY, 2015). The funding volumes in Germany have shown 
significant growth rates since 2013, many European and global leaders have 
established branches in Berlin, and German startups reached a new level of valuations 
reflecting the rising relevance of the start-up market in Germany (EY, 2015). 
Therefore, it is of interest for research and practice to gain deeper insights into the 
specialties of the German VC market as previous research primarily focused on the 
VC market in the United States. 
The US and the German VC market are not comparable for several reasons. Recent 
developments of the European and German VC market can be attributed to differences 
in financial market development, tax policy, labor market regulations, public spending 
on research and development as well as technology transfer policies (Black & Gilson, 
1998; Bosma & Levi, 2010; Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Lerner & Tåg, 2013). These causes result in several 
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effects influencing management practices of VCCs in Germany, but also affect deal 
structure and size in the German VC market. For example, German VCCs are not 
allowed to be operatively involved with a venture. Even though deal sizes have been 
on the rise in the last years, deal sizes are not comparable. In the US deal sizes surpass 
those in Germany by far, implying a different risk aversion, but also availability of 
capital. Furthermore US VCCs are more professionalized in their management 
functions across the investment process (Lerner & Tåg, 2013). Hence, risk and return 
management is of higher relevance for European and German VCCs compared to the 
US market where exit possibilities are limited and active management support, i.e. 
active involvement including risk management and value adding activities, is 
restricted.  
Therefore, this dissertation aims to contribute to the literature stream of venture capital 
by addressing risk assessment and management as well as value adding activities of 
VCCs based on a rare, longitudinal data set from Germany. The authors’ analysis of 
the current status of existing literature shows that considerable research gaps exist in 
the field of venture capital due to the lack of in-depth, longitudinal data to study the 
whole investment process of VCCs, the lack of new data in this field of research as 
well as data from Germany. The goal of this thesis is to contribute to this literature 
stream.  
The thesis consists of four articles on the topic of risk and return management in 
venture capital companies during the post-investment phase. An overview of the 
articles regarding authorship, contribution and publication status is provided in table 1. 
The first two articles contribute to the topic of risk, risk assessment and risk 
management analyzing deal documents of German venture capital companies. The 
second two articles elaborate on the return side, i.e. investigating value adding 
activities of venture capital companies.  
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Main responsibility 
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Author 
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results was 
collaborative 
Shared main 
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Dorian Proksch 
 
Main responsibility 
for literature 
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Shared 
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research design, 
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writing and 
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results 
Author´s 
independent 
research 
Publication 
status 
Forthcoming in: 
International Journal 
of Entrepreneurial 
Venturing (VHB 
Ranking in 2014: 
B). 
Presented at: 
Annual Risk 
Governance 
Conference in 2015. 
The later version 
was published in the 
Journal of 
Entrepreneurial 
Finance, 18 (2016), 
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2014: C) 
Published in: 
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International Journal 
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(VHB Ranking in 
2014: C) 
Published in: 
International 
Review of 
Entrepreneurship, 
14 (2016) 3 (Cra 
Ranking 2012: Top 
international 
journal) 
 
Table 1 Summary of contributions, publications and co-authors of different chapters 
As follows, a summary of each article including research gap, the methodology used, 
the main findings and the contribution of the article are presented:  
Article 1: Risk types and risk assessment in venture capital investments: A 
content analysis of investors´ original documents 
 Research gap: Assessing and managing risk is a major task of venture capital 
companies. Despite the topic´s high practical relevance, there is very little 
literature in this field. We aim to extend the academic discussion by 
investigating the risk types and risk assessment in venture capital investments. 
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 Methodology: We analyzed more than 500 deal documents of nine German 
venture capital companies using content analysis which resulted in 2,452 
qualitative quotes. 
 Main findings: We categorized these quotes into seven risk types, namely 
financial, market, strategy, technology, production, human capital, and legal 
risks, implying their relevance during the VC investment process. Market risk 
and technology risk are mentioned the most in the due diligence and the 
decision papers. Financial risk with 710 quotes is the most often documented 
risk considering all venture capital documents. 
 Contribution: Overall, risk assessment appears to be highly unsystematic and 
subjective across VCCs. Consequently, we can add to the studies by Moesel, 
Fiet and Busenitz (2001), Schefczyk (2006), Zellmann, Prengel and Lebschi 
(2014), who highlight that risk assessment needs further investigation, as well 
as more structured and comprehensive approaches. We add to the studies by 
Chen, Yao and Kotha (2009) and Mason and Stark (2004), who likewise 
analyzed business plans and showed that especially market issues are highly 
relevant for VCCs in the investment decision making process. Considering the 
analysis of business plans, we cannot support Chen et al. (2009) and Mason and 
Stark (2004) that financial risks are of highest importance as market, 
technology and production risks were mentioned most. However, over the 
whole investment process financial risks are highly relevant. 
Article 2: Risk management in the venture capital industry: Managing risk in 
portfolio companies 
 Research gap: Risk management pursued in VC-backed ventures is only 
moderately researched in academic literature (Tan et al., 2008; Yoshikawa, 
Phan, & Linton, 2004). Previous studies either focus on single types of risk, e.g. 
macro-risk (Ning, Wang, & Bo, 2015) or liquidity risk (Cumming, Fleming, & 
Suchard, 2005) or on specific types of risk management measures, e.g. 
syndication (Wang, Wuebker, Han, & Ensley, 2012; Hopp, 2010) or financial 
contracting and incentive mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Studies analyzing 
comprehensive sets of risk management measures applied by VCCs ventures 
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are limited (see e.g. Kut, Pramborg, & Smorlarski, 2006; Kut, Pramborg, & 
Smorlarski, 2007; Kut & Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski, Verick, Foxen, & Kut, 
2005). However, risk management is one of the core competencies of VCC and 
therefore a highly relevant topic in practice.  
 Methodology: We conducted a structured literature review which was the basis 
for developing five hypotheses concerning measures to decrease failure risk in 
venture capital-backed ventures. We tested these hypotheses with an empirical 
data set of 93 venture capital-backed ventures in Germany using original deal 
data from nine different venture capital funds using a structural equation model. 
 Main findings: We showed that the experience and the skills of the 
corresponding investment manager have a significant negative impact on the 
failure risk of a venture. Investment manager´s experience and skills were 
measured by the working and founding experience, the technology expertise 
and the network size. Hence, the results emphasize the importance of the 
selection of the investment manager for risk management in venture capital 
investments. 
Article 3: Value adding activities of venture capital companies: A content analysis 
of investor´s original documents in Germany 
 Research gap: Value adding activities are a complex, highly diversified topic 
and moderately analyzed in academic literature foremost due to the lack of 
publicly available date from VCCs. Furthermore, value adding activities vary 
across countries due to different legal and tax requirements. Therefore, we aim 
to provide in-depth details into the practices of VCCs in Germany which is so 
far an undeveloped field in this literature stream. 
 Methodology: We qualitatively analyzed value adding activities using a 
longitudinal data set obtained from nine venture capital companies in Germany. 
We had access to investor´s original documents including business plans, 
investment committee papers, reporting and annual statements of the 
investments. This enabled us to create a typology for which value adding 
services were performed 
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 Main findings: The results suggest that venture capital companies are highly 
engaged in supporting ventures in financial and human capital issues as well as 
in establishing strong governance mechanisms to reduce information 
asymmetries between founders and investors. Further, the provision of relevant 
contacts through venture capital companies’ network is moderately applied. 
Support in operational issues is of low relevance. 
 Contribution: We showed that VC can provide a broad portfolio of value 
adding activities throughout the investment phase. However, the use in practice 
appears to be rather inhomogeneous and partially structured in terms of 
documentation. Possibly, founders are not aware which value adding activities 
can be provided by the respective VCC. Hence, selecting the most suitable and 
valuable VCC can be an opaque and uncertain decision for founders. For VCC, 
a systematic application of value adding activities might increase the chance of 
successful investments. We observed that e.g. governance mechanisms are a 
common method across VCC since they are applied in nearly all cases in our 
sample.  
Article 4: Value adding activities in venture capital literature: A review on data, 
variables and methods 
 Research gap: Established literature has shown that venture capital funds’ high 
returns can be partly attributed to value adding activities performed by the 
venture capital firms in their portfolio firms. Despite of the topic´s importance, 
to date there is no structured literature review providing possibilities for 
improvements concerning data and methods. This paper provides a literature 
analysis on value adding activity measures in venture capital investments, 
synthesizes the variables measuring the main levers of value adding and 
identifies directions for improvement in terms of data, variables and methods. 
 Methodology: Using the approach of a structured literature review, the author 
studied 37 articles regarding the type of data collection method, methodology, 
sample region and variables. 
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 Main findings: The analyses showed that data are primarily gathered through 
databases or surveys which are subject to several limitations. To measure value 
adding activities great inconsistencies exist regarding the variables used. 
 Contribution: The author contributes to the literature stream with the following 
suggestions to improve the data collection and data analyses methods, i.e. using 
original deal documents rather than surveys or databases, including perspectives 
from multiple stakeholders in the analysis, improving consistency in variables 
used to measure a certain value adding activity type, developing and using 
established scales to measure similar variables, improving consistency in usage 
of dependent variable and increasing the number of international and 
comparative studies.  
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2. The entire research project 
The empirical analyses of the research papers in this dissertation are based on a joint 
research project of Technical University Dresden and HHL Leipzig Graduate School 
of Management called “Strategisches Risikomanagement in Frühphasenfonds” 
(English translation: “Strategic risk management in early-stage financing”). The 
project was initiated and is led by Prof. Dr. Andreas Pinkwart and Prof. Dr. Michael 
Schefczyk. The purpose of the project is to analyze the different management areas of 
early stage German VCCs financing NTBFs. Therefore, the process of capital 
provision, investment selection, VC networks, management support, risk management 
and internationalization were investigated.  
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of topics of research project "Strategic risk management in early-stage 
financing" (own illustration) 
 
The literature stream of venture capital still lacks adequate reliable data and especially 
in-depth data. The majority of former studies have already provided valuable insights 
into the practices of VCCs using data bases, surveys and interviews to collect data. 
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Nevertheless, deal document analysis has been rarely applied so far. Additionally, 
longitudinal data is a rarity in this literature stream. Hence, this research project aims 
to close this gap by collecting longitudinal data based on deal documents and a survey 
from nine VCCs and 128 VC-backed respective investments in Germany. The 
researchers had access to the anonymized original deal documents including decision 
files, business plans, due diligence papers, investment committee papers and the 
continuous reporting like qualitative and quantitative reporting, milestones and board 
meeting minutes. In addition, a survey with all respective investment managers was 
conducted covering the main topics of the analysis. By doing so, in-depth, longitudinal 
qualitative and quantitative data were gathered which cover the entire investment 
process of VCCs. 
A code book was developed in order to use qualitative data for quantitative analyses. 
Three researchers rated the quantitative quotes based on anchor phrases. As quality 
measure Krippendorff´s alpha was applied based on the principle of investigator 
triangulation. The feasibility of this approach was tested in pretests with eight NTBFs 
from three VCCs. In that course, the code book was rarefied in several rounds. The 
value of Krippendorff´s alpha was above 0.8 for all variables which is an acceptable 
value according to Krippendorff (2004). In total, more than 10.000 quantitative codes 
were coded.  
The sample consists of 128 VC-backed ventures of nine German VCCs. The VCCs 
invested in NTBFs of which 42 % operated in information technologies, 34 % in life 
sciences, 14 % in material sciences and 10 % in other industries. The companies in the 
sample are on overage 5.1 years old. The average number of the founder team is three. 
The VC-backed ventures finished on average two financing rounds. In the first round 
on average 700.000 Euros were collected and in the second round 1.000.000 Euros. 18 
of the VC-backed ventures went bankrupt.  
In addition to the articles in this thesis, the following journal articles and dissertations 
were conducted in the course of this entire research project: 
 Fiegler, T. (2016). Venture Capital-Netzwerke. Eine empirische Analyse 
innerhalb der Frühphasenfinanzierung. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer Gabler 
Verlag.  
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 Pinkwart, A., Proksch, D., Schefczyk, M., Fiegler, T., & Ernst, C. (2015). 
Reasons for the failure of new technology-based firms: a longitudinal empirical 
study for Germany”. Credit and Capital Markets, 48(4), 597-627. 
 Pinkwart, A., & Proksch, D. (2014). The internationalization behavior of 
German high-tech start-ups: An empirical analysis of key resources. 
Thunderbird International Business Review, 56(1), 43-53. 
 Proksch, D. (2015). The development of German new technology-based firms 
from a resource-based view. Diss. Germany, Leipzig: HHL Leipzig Graduate 
School of Management. 
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Abstract  
Venture capital is an important resource for new ventures with no access to the capital 
market. However, venture capital companies’ investment decisions could be extremely 
risky. Assessing and managing risk is therefore a major task of venture capital 
companies. Despite the topic´s high practical relevance, there is very little literature in 
this field. We aim to extend the academic discussion by investigating the risk types 
and risk assessment in venture capital investments. We analyzed more than 500 deal 
documents of nine German venture capital companies, resulting in 2,452 qualitative 
quotes. We categorized these quotes into seven risk types, namely financial, market, 
strategy, technology, production, human capital, and legal risks, implying their 
relevance during the VC investment process. Market risk and technology risk are 
mentioned the most in the due diligence and the decision papers. Financial risk with 
710 quotes is the most often documented risk considering all venture capital 
documents.  
Keywords 
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1 Introduction 
VC is a financing form for young, entrepreneurial ventures that VCCs provide. VC 
investments are ranked as a high risk asset class, because VCC invest in ventures with 
a high return, but also with a high risk potential. An investment decision is made under 
high uncertainty, due to the information asymmetries between VCCs and start-ups’ 
founders (Ellis, Sagiv, & Drori, 2014). Furthermore, due to their smallness and 
newness liabilities, the likelihood of failure is high for all new ventures. According to 
Zacharakis and Meyer (2000), 35 to 55 percent of VC investments fail. Hence, risk 
assessment and risk management are core and crucial VCC activities to lower the 
chances of a venture’s failure. Comprehensive risk assessment and management 
throughout the investment process could detect risks earlier, allowing the initiation of 
countermeasures that could decrease the probability of such a venture failing. 
Established literature has shown that VC investments face several risk, for example, 
agency risk (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Lu, Hwang, & Wang, 2006; Tan et al., 2008), 
liquidity or financial risk (Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2005; Kut et al., 
2007; Kut et al., 2006; Smolarski, Verick, Foxen, & Kut, 2005), technology or product 
risk (Kut et al., 2007; Kut et al., 2006; Smolarski et. al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012), 
market risk (Lu et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2012), human resources risk (Kut et al., 
2007; Kut et al., 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005), internationalization risk (LiPuma & 
Park, 2012), and macroeconomic risk (Kut et al., 2006). Furthermore, prior studies 
found that VCCs apply types or combinations of risk mitigation measures, for 
example, syndication (Wang et al., 2012; Hopp, 2010) or financial contracting, and 
incentive mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008) to overcome certain risk types. In the 
literature stream on VC investment, selection criteria studies have identified the 
analyzed criteria and those that are the most relevant. In their work, Chen et al. (2009) 
and Mason and Stark (2004) focus on business plan analysis. Owing to the sensitivity 
of deal documents, other VC documents have been rarely analyzed. It is crucial that 
VCCs do a continuous risk assessment throughout the investment phase, as risks can 
occur constantly; a venture could, for example, have liquidity issues and need bridge 
financing, or a founder could leave it. The relevance of different risks could change 
over time.  
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Thus, we aim at extending current literature by analyzing the risk types that are 
relevant in VC investments throughout the VC investment process. Further, we 
investigate how VCCs assess risks on a portfolio company level during the investment 
phase. We add to the literature and to practice as follows: 
1. We collected a unique data set of in-depth qualitative data from nine public and 
private VC funds in Germany, as well as data from original deal documents like 
business plans, investment committee papers, and reporting and annual 
statements. The majority of prior studies used surveys (e.g. Kut et al., 2006; Lu 
et al., 2006; Payne, Davis, Moore, & Bell, 2009, Smolarski et al., 2005), or 
databases (e.g. Cumming et al., 2005; Hopp, 2010; Wang et al., 2012) as data 
collection method. These studies already led to notable empirical results that 
contributed to the topic of VC. However, a content analysis of all the deal 
documents throughout the investment process could provide further and far-
reaching information.  
2. We identified various risk factors for seven different risk types. We showed that 
the risks were mainly described in short sentences in the deal documents. 
Certain VCCs also used scales or charts to illustrate the intensity of the risks. 
Overall, risk assessment appears to be highly unsystematic and subjective 
across VCCs. Consequently, we can add to the studies by Moesel et al. (2001), 
Schefczyk (2006), Zellmann et al.(2014), who highlight that risk assessment 
needs further investigation, as well as more structured and comprehensive 
approaches. 
We add to the studies by Chen et al. (2009) and Mason and Stark (2004), who likewise 
analyzed business plans and showed that especially market issues are highly relevant 
for VCCs in the investment decision making process. Considering the analysis of 
business plans, we cannot support Chen et al. (2009) and Mason and Stark (2004) that 
financial risks are of highest importance as market, technology and production risks 
were mentioned most. However, over the whole investment process financial risks are 
highly relevant. 
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2 Theoretical foundations  
Risk can be defined as the probability of negative effects (Aven, 2011), and is often 
associated with uncertainty. To avoid any possible negative influences on companies’ 
performance and development, all types of companies need to undertake a systematic 
identification, assessment, and treatment of risks (Hain, 2011). Since VC is rated as a 
high risk asset class, VCCs’ are perceived as risk takers by investing in young, 
entrepreneurial firms. The information asymmetries between investors and start-up 
founders are a primary driver of VC investment risk (LiPuma & Park, 2013), as is 
uncertainty regarding the venture´s market acceptance and overall development. 
Hence, VCCs apply certain tools to predict, assess, and evaluate the risks of their 
portfolio firms. Furthermore, VCCs utilize different types of risk mitigation measures 
to reduce their investment risk.  
The topic of risk assessment and risk management is still a developing topic in the 
field of entrepreneurship and venture capital. The majority of previous studies 
discussed risk attitudes and behaviors between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. 
Only a few researchers have investigated the topic of risk and risk management on a 
venture level (LiPuma & Park, 2014; Lu et al., 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005; Tan et al., 
2008), and most of these studies use US samples. Only a few studies have been 
conducted in Europe or Asia. Risk and risk management on a venture level might have 
been neglected as a topic in academic research due to the lack of in-depth data 
(Bygrave, 2006; Neergaard & Ulhoi, 2006). VC-backed ventures are private 
companies and therefore only have minor publication obligations and are, in general, 
very conservative regarding research projects.  
2.1 Risks in VCCs’ portfolio companies  
2.2.1 Relevant VCC risk types  
During the investment process, VCCs face several types of risks and uncertainties 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Prior studies have shown that VCC investments might 
be subject to agency risk, financial risk, technology risk, market risk, human capital 
risk, internationalization risk, as well as macro risk. Since each venture has a different 
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risk and return profile, the extent and combination of different risks vary for each 
venture. Hence, investment managers have to identify, assess, and manage potential 
and occurring risks individually for each venture. In the following, we discuss the 
different risk categories. 
Agency risk is one of the most important risks for VCCs due to the information 
asymmetries and the diverging targets between entrepreneurs and VCCs (Bengtsson & 
Sensoy, 2011; Gimmon, Benjamin, & Katzenstein, 2010; Lu et al., 2006). Agency 
theory dates back to the theory of the firm by William Meckling, Eugene Fama, and 
Michael Jensen, which indicates the conflict of interest between the principal and the 
agent, in our case the founders or managers of a venture and a VCC (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), there 
are four types of generic agency problems in the investment process. VCCs are 
concerned with the entrepreneur or founding team not working as expected to 
maximize a venture’s value (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Assessing the founding 
team’s personal qualities and abilities can be a difficult VCC task. Furthermore, 
disagreements might develop between the VCC and the entrepreneur or founding team 
during the investment phase. Fourthly, the founding team might leave the venture 
before the promised value is generated (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). Therefore, VCCs 
use governance mechanisms like contracting, milestones, the gradual provision of 
capital, and active board involvement to reduce the agency conflict between them and 
the founding team (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Gantenbein & Engelhardt, 2012; Lu et 
al., 2006; Tan et al., 2008).  
There are various different definitions of financial risk in academic literature. These 
definitions include all types of risks associated with the venture’s financial situation, 
for example, running out of liquidity or not reaching the planned profit. If a venture 
lacks liquidity, the financial risks regarding insolvency are high for the VCC. In 
contrast, Cumming et al. (2005) define financial risk as the exit risk for a VCC in IPO 
markets; these authors thus measure the risk of not being able to make a proper exit. 
Kut et al. (2007), Kut et al. (2006) and Smolarski et al. (2005), offer another 
perspective. In these authors’ studies financial risk was given a twofold classification: 
on the level of the portfolio and of the macro economy.  
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Technology risk is often used synonymously in academic literature as a product and 
development risk. VCCs apply technical or product due diligences to evaluate the 
technology or product risk before investing in young ventures. Furthermore, 
syndications and an industry focus are used to overcome the risk associated with 
technologies and products (see, e.g. Kut et al., 2007; Smolarski et. al., 2005; Wang et 
al., 2012). This finding is especially relevant to assess the market readiness of high-
technology products or services. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) show that 31% of 
VCCs in their study rate a product and technology as risky.  
Market risk becomes most relevant when new services or products need to be 
commercialized (Wang et al., 2012). However, market risk is also associated with 
competition or changes in the market’s attractiveness, i.e. decreasing market growth. 
Founders often lack the marketing capabilities required for a successful market entry 
(Wang et al., 2012). VCCs apply due diligences as a first step in evaluating the market 
risk before investing in a venture (Lu et al., 2006). According to Kaplan and 
Strömberg´s study (2004), the major risks related to the market concern the market 
size and growth, the competition, and entry barriers, as well as the likelihood of 
customer adoption. Nevertheless, Kaplan and Strömberg’s empirical results show that 
competition, market size, and customer adoption risks were only mentioned at a 
moderate rate of respectively 40, 31, and 22% in investment documents (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2004). 
Strategic risks are becoming increasingly important due to globalization and enduring 
periods of innovation and finite resources (Cooper & Faseruk, 2011). The existing 
literature on this topic is fragmented and no agreement on the definition of strategic 
risk currently exists (Collins & Ruefli, 1992; Cooper & Faseruk, 2011). Strategic risks 
were only seldom discussed in the context of VC. Chassang and Miguel (2010) 
defined strategic risk as the risk which occurs when market players do not share the 
same information about their environment. Contrary, Collins and Ruefli (1992) stated: 
“strategic risk for an individual firm can be defined in terms of the probability of 
losing rank position vis a vis the other firms in the reference set”. Gates (2006) 
classified strategic risks into seven major classes, i.e. industry margin squeeze, 
technology shift, brand erosion, one-kind-of competitor, customer priority shift, new 
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project failure and market stagnation. Most of these classes rather apply for large 
corporations. Cooper and Faseruk (2011) identified a negative relationship between a 
high perception of strategic risks and risk taking behavior. Hence, the results imply 
that high-risk perceptions encourage low risk-taking behavior (Cooper & Faseruk, 
2011).  
VC investments suffer from uncertainty regarding the quality, capabilities, and the 
motivation of the founding team. Hence, VCCs face human capital or human 
resources risks, which, for example, Kut et al. (2007), Kut et al. (2006), and Smolarski 
et al. (2005) analyze. These authors measure the risk, for example, as a lack of 
management performance and a lack of management focus. Human resources due 
diligences are a way of evaluating the risk associated with a venture’s management. In 
the course of such a due diligence, VCCs can verify the management team’s track 
record by using their network (Kut et al., 2007). Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) state 
that management risks were cited in 61% of their analyses. These authors’ analyses 
mentioned, for example, that the CEO is a “difficult” person, that the management 
lacks financial planning, that it is unable to focus, and that it is young and 
inexperienced (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). An incomplete management team can be 
a further human resource risk. Overall, previous studies indicated that risks associated 
with human capital are highly relevant for VCCs. 
Internationalization risk is a rather special risk type for VC-backed firms, as not all 
ventures pursue an internationalization strategy. LiPuma and Park (2012) study this 
topic with longitudinal data from 962 invested rounds in 334 VC-backed technology 
companies. They show that VCCs apply syndication, investment size, and round 
interval to mitigate internationalization risk. The results suggest that, in domestic 
investments, VCCs use smaller syndicates, provide less funding, and use fewer 
frequent investment rounds for portfolio companies that internationalize 
opportunistically (LiPuma & Park, 2012).  
2.2.2 Risk assessment in VC investments 
VCCs analyze business plans, meet entrepreneurs in person, and conduct due 
diligences to evaluate the risks of a VC investment during the investment selection 
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process (Achtleitner & Nathusius, 2003). The entrepreneurship literature 
comprehensively analyzed the topic of investment selection criteria by means of 
qualitative and quantitative methods (see e.g. Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 1999; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). Some studies, like those of Chen et al. 
(2009) and Mason and Stark (2004), focus specifically on business plan analysis in this 
context. The criteria used in the analysis of Mason and Stark (2004) reflect the major 
risks for VCCs, i.e. the entrepreneur/ management team, strategy, operations, 
product/service, market, financials, and others. The results indicate that VCCs place 
the most emphasis on market and financial issues, but also on the entrepreneurs and 
their team (Mason & Stark, 2004). Furthermore, the study by Chen et al. (2009) shows 
that the preparedness, the verbal content, and substance of the venture founder’s 
presentation, as well as the business plan quality have a positive relationship with the 
VC funding decision. All of the above studies pursue a qualitative approach to content 
analysis in order to identify relevant decision making issues for VCCs. Nevertheless, 
these studies provide no insights into the question of how VCCs analyze risks and 
document them. Furthermore, academic literature rarely describes how VCCs assess 
risks during the investment phase, i.e. analyzing documents in the later stages of the 
VC investment process like the reporting, decision papers, and board meeting 
documentations. A few practitioner articles and dissertations discuss how VCCs apply 
qualitative and quantitative parameters to evaluate a venture’s risks and returns (see, 
e.g. Zellmann et al., 2014). Qualitative factors are especially less analyzed in academic 
literature (Engel, 2003; Rieg, 2004; Schefczyk, 2006). However, qualitative factors, 
like the market and management factors, are highly relevant regarding evaluating a 
venture’s return and risk potential (Zellmann et al., 2014). Unsystematic risks and their 
assessment are strictly dependent on the investment manager’s subjective evaluation. 
Hence, risks evaluation depends on the investment manager’s experiences and current 
evaluation (Zellmann et al., 2014). Overall, the first academic and practitioner-focused 
studies have shown that evaluating risks during the investment phase is highly 
subjective and unsystematic. This finding creates opportunities for further research to 
analyze how VC practices can be improved. 
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3 Data and method 
We collected data of 95 VC-backed firms from nine VC funds in Germany, which 
included investments from 2005 to 2010. According to the BVK’s (Bundesverband 
Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften) German venture capital statistics, we 
thus covered 21.9% of the seed investments during that time. The analyzed funds 
included were either public, or a private-public partnership. 
The companies included had existed on average for 4.6 years, raised around EUR 
750,000 in the seed round, and 1,200,000 Euros in the series A round. In the seed 
round, they had on average three investors and in the series A round, four (see table 1). 
The companies operated in the high tech field, including in the information technology 
and automation (38 %), life science and material science (10%), energy (5 %), 
communication (4 %), and others industries (9 %).  
All VC funds in our sample are early stage funds. Furthermore, they do not have an 
industry focus, but a diverse portfolio. However, they only invest in technology-based 
ventures.  
Variable  Mean Median Std. Dev 
Age of portfolio companies (years) 4.59 5 2.09 
Number of founding rounds (rounds) 1.98 2 0.89 
Investment sum - Seed (Euros) 784,487 600,000 519,577 
Investment sum - Series A (Euros) 1,202,948 777,037 1,179,085 
Number of investors - Seed  2.55 2 1.98 
Number of investors - Series A  3.94 3 2.54 
Table 1: Overview of our data set 
We had access to the original deal documents, including the business plans, due 
diligence documents, decision documents, reporting of the ventures to the VC, 
reporting of the VC to its investors, and board meeting minutes. We used content 
analysis as a qualitative research method, as it is the classical procedure for analyzing 
textual material (Flick, 2015). This method enabled us to study the different risk types 
and risk assessments in VC investments. The method comprises a systematic approach 
of reading texts, images, tables, and symbols (Krippendorff, 2013). The reasoning 
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behind this method is that the area of risk management is relatively unexplored. 
Currently, there is little research on which risk types are relevant and documented, and 
how the documentation is done. 
To structure the data, we utilized the Gioia methodology (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2012). First, we read the documents several times and three researchers created codes 
developed from the documents to find repeated patterns of meaning (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). In the course of creating codes, we created a coding scheme using Braun and 
Clarke´s (2006) thematic analysis approach. This method is useful to identify, analyze, 
and report data patterns or categories (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The advantage of this 
type of analysis is that it organizes and describes the data set in great detail (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). These codes were then collected and organized into the first-order 
categories (Gioia et al., 2012). To refine the developed codes, we separated the 
categories into subgroups and omitted the less relevant topics (Flick, 2015) to develop 
the second-order analysis (Gioia et al., 2012). We pursued several cross-checking 
rounds with three researchers to develop the categories. As a last step, we aggregated 
the second-order themes into the final dimensions. Seven risk types were identified: 
financial, market, strategic, technology, production, human capital, and legal risks. We 
conducted a pre-test with three VCCs to test the feasibility of our approach by 
collecting data on nine ventures. We used this pre-test to determine which documents 
are used to document possible risks. 
To ensure that our approach was highly reliable, we made use of triangulation by 
means of three researchers, who coded the data separately and compared the results. 
We used the achieved Krippfendorff’s alpha — above 0.9 for all our risk types (see 
table 2) — as an intercoder reliability measures. This is a good value (Krippendorff, 
2004). 
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Risk type Average pair wise 
agreement 
Krippendorff’s alpha 
Financial risk 98.9 0.986 
Market risk 98.7 0.958 
Strategic risk 95.4 0.910 
Technology risk 99.5 0.993 
Production risk 99.4 0.992 
Human capital risk 96.5 0.955 
Legal risk 98.4 0.979 
Table 2: Intercoder reliability for the assessment of the different risk types 
To ensure the anonymity of the VCCs and companies, we substituted their names with 
general terms, indicating this by making use of square brackets. All the quotations 
were translated from German into English. 
4. Results 
In total, we identified 2,452 cases of risks in the analyzed documents. Decision papers 
(41 percent) and reporting of the venture (35 percent) are the two most important 
documents for the evaluation of risk, given the number of cases. The other documents 
are responsible for a rather small proportion of the mentioned overall risks. Examining 
at risk, we found that market risk and technology risk are mentioned the most in the 
due diligence and the decision papers. In the VC’s and the venture’s reporting, as well 
as in the board meetings, financial risks were mentioned most often. Table 2 
summarizes the risks described in specific documents. 
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Risk type Business 
Plan 
Due 
diligence 
Decision 
paper 
Venture 
report-
ing 
VC 
report-
ing 
Board 
meeting 
minutes 
Total Percent-
age 
Financial 
risk 
24 6 163 438 27 52 710 29 
Market 
risk 
36 70 194 93 0 9 402 16 
Strategic 
risk 
17 30 145 18 2 4 216 9 
Technology 
risk 
44 90 211 68 2 11 426 18 
Production 
risk 
32 15 98 67 4 11 227 9 
Human 
capital risk 
12 18 111 68 4 15 228 9 
Legal risk 21 23 78 99 12 10 243 10 
Total 186 252 1000 851 51 112 2452 100 
Percentage 8 10 41 35 2 4 100  
Table 3: Mentioning of specific risk types in different venture capital documents 
 
4.1 Risk types 
Following the Gioia methodology, we identified seven areas of risk in the documents: 
financial, market, strategic, technological, production, human capital, and legal risks. 
Financial risks are risks subject to the portfolio companies’ liquidity situation. The 
risk of not gaining new investors is also included, as this would lead to a future 
liquidity gap. Similarly, not reaching revenue targets might increase the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
Market risks summarize the risk that the portfolio company unable to successfully sell 
its product on the market. Reasons for such a failure can be bad market conditions, no 
demand for the portfolio company’s solution, or the portfolio company’s lack of 
selling abilities.  
Strategic risks encompass risks tailored to bad strategic choices. These choices might 
affect the market entry strategy, or the creation of a unique selling proposition. 
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Technology risks describe the risks that the technology might not work as expected, or 
might not be developed on time, which would mean that the product cannot be built, or 
only at higher costs. 
Production risks encompass all the risks that the product cannot be produced under the 
planned conditions, which include, for example, production delays and issues with 
suppliers. 
Human capital risks describe the risks that the human resources required to succeed 
are not available or might no longer be available for the portfolio company.  
Legal risks describe all the risks dealing with the law and regulatory frameworks. 
These risks include intellectual property rights, contracting, tax, and other 
governmental regulations. 
Each risk type in the separate areas is described in the following. 
4.1.1 Financial risk 
With 710 identified quotes, financial risk is the most mentioned risk in the VC 
documents.  
New ventures are in general only financed for a short period of time. Therefore, 
liquidity plays a major role, which we also identified in our documents. 41 percent of 
all of the quotes in the area of financial risks dealt with assessing the liquidity risk. 
Most of the quotes dealt with the current liquidity risks, which the following examples 
show: 
 “Status of liquidity: yellow: The first customer was obtained. Nevertheless, 
more customers are needed to reach the revenue goals in 2010.” 
“Despite the positive revenue and cost development, the liquidity situation of 
[company] is tense due to the customers’ payment overruns. Specifically, the final 
payment of [customer 1] of EUR 375 thousand could fail ([customer 1] is in trouble).” 
If liquidity is a continuous issue, ventures might face a high risk of going bankrupt, 
which the following phrases show: 
“Based on the current ratio of costs and earnings, as well as the current order 
situation, we estimate that the company will be insolvent in [date].” 
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 “It is clear that the company will be insolvent in [date1] if the money to reach the first 
milestone is not paid before [date 2].” 
Besides the liquidity and bankruptcy risks, ventures usually need several financial 
rounds to reach the break-even point. Failing to obtain follow-up financing is a severe 
risk for ventures, which the following quote shows: 
“As already stated in the ad-hoc information of [date], [investor 1] 
unexpectedly cancelled the negotiations for a follow-up financing.” 
VCCs set certain milestones for ventures to ensure they achieve their revenue goals. In 
our documents, we identified the risk of not reaching the expected revenues in 127 
quotations, as illustrated in the following: 
“The order situation is weaker than expected, therefore it’s not clear whether 
the revenue goals of [company] can be reached. There are no signed orders, 
but promising inquiries (see sales pipeline).” 
“The planned revenues were missed by 24 percent (a detailed analysis will follow).” 
4.1.2 Market risk 
We identified 402 mentions of market risk in the deal documents, which implies the 
high relevance of this risk type for VCCs. Market risks are diverse, since they cover 
various fields, for example, the market entry, market acceptance, market potential, and 
marketing and sales issues.  
VCCs wrote the following about market entry: 
“There is still a possibility that the market entry is going to be hindered by 
competitors in this segment. Owing to the diversification of the customer 
structure and the proprietary product, this risk is ranked as moderately high.” 
“The market entry carries risks, because of the dependence on cooperation partners 
regarding the development of the products and the resulting licensing contracts.” 
For young ventures, the risk associated with market acceptance is highly important, as 
they enter a new market with a new product or service, meaning the market is not 
familiar with them. To overcome the problem of newness and market acceptance, 
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reference customers provide the market with a positive signal. In the deal documents, a 
high risk due to a lack of market acceptance was described as follows: 
“Moderate customer acceptance.” 
“Physicians do not sufficiently accept MR-guided procedures in minimally invasive 
interventions.” 
Marketing, i.e. product, pricing, placement, and promotion risks, comprised 10% of 
the market risks. VCCs documented the following: 
“Long marketing cycles to achieve customers’ trust” 
“Currently there are deficits in the marketing and sales” 
“Decreasing prices for products in this segment. However, material costs are 
also decreasing.” 
Risks due to a lack of sales activities and sales competencies, resulting in 
shortcomings in terms of the revenue, is a further issue for VCCs: 
 “Sales are currently stagnating. The venture is not developing as expected. In 
the future, we have to ensure that sales increase, possibly by hiring new 
employees. The current orders do not match the venture’s core offerings.” 
 “We see that the sales cycle is slower than planned and expected. Hence, the venture 
has not generated any substantial revenue so far.” 
4.1.3 Strategic risk 
We identified 216 mentions of strategic risks in the deal documents. The predominant 
risk in this category is competition, which was responsible for 54.6% of the strategic 
risks. Further risks are, for example, market entry barriers, market positioning, and 
market structure. 
Competition appears to be a crucial risk for VCCs. VCCs mainly described the current 
competitive situation and competition intensity in the core market. If competition is 
high, VCCs documented the following: 
“Increasing competition in the Asian market due to research projects and spin-
offs.” 
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“Increasing pressure due to competition: There is a risk that potential customers may 
imitate the venture’s offerings, but the market development appears to be positive.” 
“In the coming month, further competitors might enter the market.” 
Market entry barriers are a major threat for ventures. If market entry barriers are high, 
ventures’ market entry might become a tedious process often requiring more resources 
than expected. Especially technology-based ventures frequently need certifications or 
approvals to sell their products. Hence, VCCs reported the following:  
“There are high market entry barriers for followers.” 
“The market entry barriers for this system are extremely high.” 
“The market entry is regulated therefore entering the market is often delayed 
and might become a lengthy process.” 
Market positioning reflects the venture’s current or targeted strategic position in the 
target market, which changes often in the early stage. This regular change is reflected 
in the following quotations: 
“The investment manager perceives the market positioning of the venture as 
weak, which is not surprising in the pre-clinical phase.” 
“The investment manager highlights that competitors crowd the target markets, 
therefore a different market positioning should be considered.” 
 
4.1.4 Technology risk 
Technology risk was documented 426 times in our sample. This risk is particularly 
relevant in the pre-founding phase, in which founders develop the technology into a 
viable product. Especially in technology-based firms, the product development process 
might last several years, often implying a high degree of uncertainty and requiring 
large financial resources.  
VCCs often documented the general status of risk associated with technology.  
“General technology risks are not observable.” 
“The common technology risks are present. However, they are of minor relevance.” 
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In their deal documents, VCCs reported the success and failure of prototypes and tests 
of the venture´s technology. VCCs mentioned, for example, whether the tests were 
done on time, their results, and whether prototypes already existed. 
“The third system has been assembled. The evaluation project for a new 
hardware supplier has been started. The first tests are expected to be completed 
in [month, year] at the supplier’s site and afterwards at the venture.” 
“While developing the first prototypes [founder 1] and [founder 2] identified several 
technical problems. This means the systems are not running smoothly.” 
Furthermore, we observed that some VCCs use external partners to evaluate 
technology. In the course of such an evaluation, technical due diligences are often 
conducted. 
“The result of the technical due diligence is negative. The evaluator identified 
several bugs and gaps in the system security. He recommends switching to 
other software immediately, or eliminating the bugs in the existing software.” 
VCCs set milestones for the development of technology for portfolio companies and 
track their achievement:   
“Technology development: As reported in June 2011, (the venture) will not 
reach the technical milestones.” 
4.1.5 Production risk 
A total of 227 quotations dealt with production risks. We were able to identify the 
three main areas in which risks occurred. The first area was the production’s proof of 
concept. At 42 percent, this risk type was the most addressed area, as described in the 
following quotation: 
“Low production risk as the production plant is already running.” 
The second category focuses on delays in producing the goods: 
“There are long delays in production, as renting a new production space has 
been impossible to date.” 
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“Proof of quality as assessed by a third party is missing. Readiness for series 
production not achieved.” 
The last area comprises risks in working with suppliers, which the following 
quotations show: 
“We couldn’t deliver our systems, because the [product parts] were missing. 
We assume that we can resolve the issues with our suppliers on [date].” 
“[Supplier] has problems with delivering the goods and can’t supply [company] with 
enough [product] within the next two years.” 
4.1.6 Human capital risk 
We identified two major areas of human capital risks by analyzing the documents: 
Risks concerning the management team and risks concerning the workforce. 39 
percent of our 228 identified quotations dealt with risks concerning the management 
team. In a new venture, the founders are the most crucial human resources, which the 
following quotations show: 
“The company development still relies strongly on the original management 
team.” 
“High dependence, especially in the early stage, on the chief developer (one of the 
shareholders).” 
If one of the founders leaves the company, the company might face severe risks, as 
described in some cases: 
“[Founder 1] says that he will quit his job as CEO with immediate effect, due to 
personal reasons.” 
“The CEO is seriously ill and has been in hospital for two weeks.” 
Further, in many cases, the management team was not complete, which required the 
recruitment of a new manager to fill the gap, which the following quotes show: 
36 
“Management team gaps: It is necessary to recruit a vice president of 
operations for an optimal management team performance. We need him to have 
enough impact and control on the day-to-day operational side.” 
“In the short term, the management team should be extended with a sales director with 
software experience.” 
46 percent of HR risk quotes dealt with the workforce. A major risk is that the team is 
unable to handle the work, as in the following quotes: 
“There are bottlenecks in the IT and not all tasks can be completed. A new 
developer should be hired.” 
“A sales person is urgently needed.” 
However, ventures sometimes have problems recruiting qualified employees, as the 
following quotes show: 
“Working on finding new employees (employment agency, temporary 
employment agency, direct addressing, personal network) has had 
unsatisfactory results. The job market is empty. There is no engineer with 
construction experience on the market.” 
“Owing to the specialization required, it is unexpectedly difficult to find the required 
software developer. Other applicants have been interviewed and it seems that there 
might be qualified candidates.” 
4.1.7 Legal risk 
Examining the legal risks, we identified intellectual property risks as the most relevant 
category. 47 percent of all cases of legal risks dealt with intellectual property. The 
question of patenting opportunities is of especially high relevance for VCCs, which the 
following quote shows: 
“Unlike in the US, genes and their mutations are not patentable in Germany 
and Europe. Scientific publications can access information on genetic changes 
and their possible consequence free of charge. Consequently, the tests are not 
patentable and could be imitated.”  
37 
Furthermore, there is a risk due to possible patent infringements, as the following 
quote shows: 
“The patent due diligence has been conducted. The finding is that the US 
market cannot be accessed due to the patent situation, but no others 
interferences are expected from other patents.” 
If a patent is approved, companies have a competitive advantage. However, a patent 
filing is not always successful, given the following quote on the risk of imitations: 
“Objection to a [company] patent arrived. The management team, with the 
support of the patent lawyer [patent lawyer], will now investigate this.”  
A further risk includes governmental regulations, which were documented in 14 
percent of all the legal risk mentions. Therefore, current and future regulations are 
analyzed: 
“A change in the scientific framework (legal framework of working with 
genetics) could hinder an important part of the business model of [company]. 
Stronger security guidelines could lead to higher R&D and production costs, 
and therefore reduce the cost advantage of [product].” 
“In the long run, there is a risk of the discontinuation of governmental subsidies for 
[industry]. At the moment, there is no political statement indicating this development.” 
Certification of products can be crucial for entering a market. Hence, if a venture fails 
to receive certification, this can lead to high risks: 
“The company has successfully filed for [certification]. All legal conditions to 
sell on the European market have been fulfilled.” 
Further, legal risks due to problems with the contracts wording: 
“The contract has several weaknesses and we therefore recommend removing 
these in the next financial round.” 
Table 4 summarizes our results. The table also includes identified subcategories not 
previously described, because we focused on the areas most described in the 
documents. Table 4 provides a holistic view of all the subcategories. 
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Risk types Identified subcategories 
Financial risk Liquidity, solvency, revenue development, follow-up financing, bridge 
financing, financial planning, governmental sponsorships, credits 
Market risk Market assessment, market attractiveness including potential and 
development, market acceptance, founder´s market know-how, marketing 
and sales, product portfolio, pricing, regulation, customer awareness and 
behavior 
Strategy risk Competition, market positioning, market structure, market entry barriers, 
unique selling proposition 
Technology 
risk 
Prototypes and tests, proof of concept, marketability studies, certification 
and patents, quality issues regarding technology, supplier products, 
competitive positioning of technology, implementation of technology, 
market acceptance of technology, know-how regarding technology 
Production 
risk 
Production delays, supplier issues, increase in prices of raw materials, 
quality issues after producing the product, changes in production facilities 
Human capital 
risk 
Management team, stock of employees, salary issues, parental leave, hiring 
of external consultants to complement the managing team 
Legal risk Intellectual property, governmental regulations, contracting, tax issues, 
insurances, legal conflicts with former founders, consultations of lawyers 
Table 4: Summary of the different risks reported in the VC documents 
 
4.2 Risk assessment methods 
Our second research question aims at answering how VCCs assess and record risks in 
their deal documents. We found that, in our sample, risk assessment and 
documentation were done mostly descriptively and highly unsystematically. 94% of 
the risk mentions were of a qualitative nature, i.e. in the document, investment 
managers described the existence of a certain risk type in a venture. In most cases, the 
extent of the risk was outlined. Furthermore, risk management measures were 
sometimes described. In addition to description of risks, VCCs also used graphical or 
quantitative risk assessment methods, for example, traffic lights and bar charts. These 
types of assessment techniques were used in only 6% of all quotes. 
We observed two types of traffic lights systems to evaluate the degree of the risks. 
First, some VCCs assessed risks by means of green, yellow, and red. Other VCCs used 
a framework differentiating between five evaluations of risk, i.e. green, yellow, 
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orange, red, and ad hoc. Sometimes VCCs also used colors in their descriptions of risk 
to illustrate the extent of a certain risk. 
In addition, VCCs utilized bar charts with different scales to illustrate whether an issue 
has a high or low risk for the investment. Our analysis showed that the VCCs primarily 
applied scales from -3 to +3 or from 0 to 100 percent. We observed that some VCCs 
used these scales systematically to evaluate common types of risks for ventures, for 
example, various market and technical risks resulting in a total assessment of the 
venture. 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Our results firstly showed that VCCs documented seven risk types, namely financial, 
market, strategy, technology, production, human capital, and legal risks, implying their 
relevance during the VC investment process. Contrary to prior literature, agency 
(Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Gimmon et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2006) and 
internationalization (LiPuma & Park, 2012) were not documented in our sample, 
which may be due to the following two reasons: First, agency risk is a rather 
theoretical term. However, we assume that agency risk is not a common term in 
practice and that VCCs included descriptions in other risk types, for example, human 
capital or financial risks. These risk types might include the motivation of the 
founder’s team or the information asymmetries between the entrepreneurs and the 
VCCs. In addition, because they are handled implicitly, agency risks might not be 
documented. Instead, phone calls or personal meetings might be used to address 
agency risks. On examining internationalization risk, we observed that the ventures in 
our sample have a rather low tendency to internationalize. Hence, this issue is of less 
relevance for the VCCs in our data set. Surprisingly, the analysis showed that legal 
risks were mentioned more than 200 times in the deal documents. To date, this risk 
type is only found very rarely in the entrepreneurship literature, as most of the prior 
studies analyzed other types of risk, such as agency risk (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011), 
market risk (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004; Lu et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2012), and HR/ 
founding team risk (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004; Kut et al., 2007; Kut et al., 2006; 
Smolarski et al., 2005). VC contracts and patents were the focus of previous research 
on legal issues. Our study provides insights into more legal issues, like governmental 
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regulations, tax issues, insurances, legal conflicts with former founders, and 
consultations with lawyers.  
Our results add to the work done by Chen et al. (2009) and Mason and Stark (2004), as 
we can confirm that market issues are specifically highly relevant for VCCs in the 
investment decision making process. However, we cannot support financial risks being 
the only other important area. Our results further suggest that technology and 
production issues were documented more often in the pre-investment phase, which 
contradicts Chen et al.´s and Mason and Stark´s results. This finding might be due to 
our sample’s focus on technology-based firms, for which a profound technical analysis 
is highly relevant before an investment decision is made. VCCs hire industry experts 
and consultants to conduct technical due diligences and provide their opinions on the 
technology to evaluate the risk associated with a venture’s technology.  
Furthermore, we observed variations in the documentation of the risks in different 
documents, indicating that the relevance of certain risk types changes over time and 
differs between addressees of specific documents. Financial risks are a major issue in 
venture reporting, as well as in the board meeting minutes. This implies that VCCs 
primarily require financial information in a venture’s regular reporting. In addition, 
since the board represents the venture owners, its major focus appears to be the 
venture’s financial development. With regard to decision papers, the market was 
primarily documented, but also technological and financial issues.  
The results regarding the risk assessment topic suggest that VCCs record and assess 
risks unsystematically and subjectively. Only 6 percent of the VCCs used structured 
forms like traffic light systems and bar charts to describe risks and their extent. We can 
thus confirm the results of Moesel et al. (2001), Schefczyk (2006), and Zellmann et al. 
(2014), who all emphasized the irregularity of risk reporting in VC investments. In 
addition, this study provides information on qualitative risks, for example, HR, market, 
and legal risks, which Engel (2003), Rieg (2004), and Schefczyk (2006) identified as a 
relevant research topic. Qualitative risk factors are primarily described in sentences 
and merely evaluated by means of traffic light systems or bar charts. Nevertheless, 
when a firm uses traffic light systems or bar charts, qualitative risks, like quantitative 
risks, are classified by means of these structured forms.  
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6. Limitations, implications, and further ideas for research 
6.1 Limitations 
Risk management is a sensitive topic, which means that some risks might be omitted 
in the documents. From interviews with expert we knew that strong risks are often 
only reported as the last possibility. Furthermore, prior literature has shown that 
decision making in VC investments is often highly subjective (Moesel et al., 2001) and 
that various factors influence it. Hence, VCCs might not report all risks in their deal 
documents, which would support the study by Manigart et al. (2002), who show that 
risk analysis is largely unsystematic and cannot be easily differentiated. However, we 
think that the variety of documents and the high number of quotations in our study 
enabled us to create a holistic view of risks in VC investment, although we are aware 
of the limitations of content analysis.  
In addition, our method only allowed us to observe documented risks. For example, 
agency risk certainly plays a role, as the VCCs in our data set also used reporting, 
incentives, and vesting or drag-along clauses. These mechanisms help reduce agency 
risk. However, VCCs did not document agency risks issues directly in the deal 
documents in our sample. Interviewing VCC investment managers might allow us to 
gain further insight into how VCCs perceive agency risk and how they deal with this 
issue. 
Furthermore, the sample was only collected from VCCs in Germany; consequently, 
our results should be transferred to other countries very carefully. The legal 
requirements for VC funds and VCCs in Germany differ from those of the US where, 
for example, VCCs are not allowed to be involved operatively with a venture. Deal 
sizes are smaller in Germany, which means that German VCCs have a different risk 
aversion. In addition, US VCCs are more professionalized and we can assume that 
their risk assessment is also more developed.  
Further, there might be a possible bias in our findings, due to our sample including VC 
investments from 2005-2010, i.e. during the financial crisis. The risks were probably 
rated higher during this period, due to the economic downturn and restricted capital 
situation.  
42 
Our data set consists of a higher share of public and public private partnerships funds. 
This might create a bias, because public funds can have other investment goals than 
private funds. Public funds also tend to have a higher risk aversion than private funds. 
Hence, public funds’ documentation and consideration of risks might be more intense 
and of higher relevance. 
Our sample covers early stage VC funds investing in technology based ventures, 
therefore transferring the results to later stage VC funds or other industry investments, 
like e-commerce, should be done cautiously.   
6.2 Implications and further ideas for research 
Our research has several implications for the literature and practice.  
In terms of the literature, the analysis has shown that the literature stream is rather 
underdeveloped, but nevertheless of great practical importance, for VCCs. We aim to 
encourage discussions on and analyses of this field of research to shed more light on 
VCC risk management practices. We observed that legal risks were less studied, 
therefore it might be interesting to analyze the importance and different aspects of 
legal risks in future studies. A possible research question could be the relevance and 
peculiarities of legal risks in VC investments in different legal systems. We also 
identified the importance of a precise specification of a certain risk type, as different 
interpretations might otherwise arise. This is especially important when creating a 
survey as a data collection method, because the results might otherwise not be 
comparable. A further direction for research might be a cross-country analysis of the 
risks and a risk assessment, as there are several differences between European and US 
VCCs (see section 6.1 limitations). A mixed method approach including, for example, 
interviews, verbal protocol analysis, and content analysis might be favorable to 
explore aspects of formal and informal risk assessment in VC investments. 
Furthermore, since our sample is limited to early stage VC funds investing in 
technology-based firms, further investigations into different fund stages and sector 
specializations might be of interest to explore the differences.  
In terms of practice, we showed that the documentation of risks is highly diverse. 
Broad topics, like financial risk, are often assessed and documented from a high 
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perspective level by using a single item like a value on a bar chart. Furthermore, 
asking investment managers to rate financial risks from -3 to +3 might not lead to 
comparable results, as they would interpret risks differently. A high financial risk 
might mean not reaching a multiple of five when selling the investment for one 
investment manager, while, it might mean a strong danger of the portfolio company 
being lost due to bankruptcy. This difference makes it difficult to compare investment 
cases within a portfolio. Using a structured assessment of all the risks might ensure 
comparability and a better assessment of the overall risks. VCCs could thus use a risk 
matrix to track risks better, which would also make it possible to track and visualize 
changes in the risk profile. Finally, we observed that risks were mainly described in 
short sentences. Using visualizations like traffic lights or bar charts might make it 
easier for investment managers and board members to interpret the current risk status. 
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Abstract  
Managing risk is one of the main activities of venture capital companies. Despite the 
fact that this topic is of high practical relevance, only little research was published on 
risk management performed by venture capital companies in their ventures. Hence, we 
conducted a structured literature review which was the basis for developing five 
hypotheses concerning measures to decrease failure risk in venture capital-backed 
ventures. We tested these hypotheses with an empirical data set of 93 venture capital-
backed ventures in Germany using original deal data from nine different venture 
capital funds using a structural equation model. We showed that the experience and the 
skills of the corresponding investment manager have a significant negative impact on 
the failure risk of a venture. Investment manager´s experience and skills were 
measured by the working and founding experience, the technology expertise and the 
network size. Hence, the results emphasize the importance of the selection of the 
investment manager for risk management in venture capital investments.  
Keywords 
Risk management, failure risk, venture capital, new-technology-based firm 
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1 Introduction 
Risk management can add value and is necessary in all types of companies to secure 
long-term stability (Frooth, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; Mackay & Moeller, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the topic of risk management is still in its infancy as articles are mainly 
published in finance and accounting, but less in management or entrepreneurship 
journals (Bromiley, McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2015). Especially VC 
investments are well known as high risk investments since VCCs invest in ventures 
with a high growth but also high risk potential (LiPuma & Park, 2014). Young 
entrepreneurial firms face the challenge of “liability of newness” resulting in particular 
difficulties, e.g. shorter expected life, and a greater risk of failure (Ang, 1992; 
Coleman, 2004). In the investment decision making process, VCCs are often faced 
with uncertainty about the future performance of the venture and the adverse selection 
problem. The reason for that is that VCCs have to rely on information about the 
venture supplied by the entrepreneur (Tourani-Rad & England, 2003). A comparative 
study by Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) showed that VC investments fail at a rate of 35 
to 55 per cent. Young and entrepreneurial firms are an essential part of the German 
economy and an important source for innovation in order to stay competitive on a 
global basis. Hence, research on comprehensive risk management for the VC industry 
is of great practical importance to improve the practices how German VCCs pursue 
risk management which might reduce the risk of failure of their ventures. 
Risk management pursued in VC-backed ventures is only moderately researched in 
academic literature (Tan et al., 2008; Yoshikawa et al., 2004). Previous studies either 
focus on single types of risk, e.g. macro-risk (Ning et al., 2015) or liquidity risk 
(Cumming et al., 2005) or on specific types of risk management measures, e.g. 
syndication (Wang et al., 2012; Hopp, 2010) or financial contracting and incentive 
mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Studies analyzing comprehensive sets of risk 
management measures applied by VCCs ventures are limited (see e.g. Kut et al., 2006; 
Kut et al., 2007; Kut & Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005). These studies used 
comparable methods and similar samples leading to a lack of new findings (Dimov & 
Murray, 2008; Milavo & Fernhaber, 2009). However, risk management is one of the 
core competencies of VCC and therefore a highly relevant topic in practice. One 
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reason for the limited amount of studies in this field might be the lack of reliable data. 
VC-backed ventures are private companies and only limited subject to the duty of 
publishing company data and financial statements (Bygrave, 2006; Neergaard & 
Ulhoi, 2006). 
To analyze risk management measures and their impact on the failure risk of VC-
backed ventures we pursued the following research strategy: We conducted a 
structured literature review to develop five hypotheses on risk management measures 
applied by VCC in ventures, i.e. the assessment and evaluation of new ventures, 
contracts, investment manager´s experience and skills, governance mechanisms and 
management support. These hypotheses were tested with a structural equation model 
using an empirical data set of 93 VC-backed ventures in Germany from nine different 
VC funds.  
As risk management received relatively little attention in entrepreneurship literature 
(Pinkwart, 2002) and is an important research topic, but largely unsystematic and not 
easy to diversify (Manigart et al., 2002), we add to literature and practice as follows: 
1. We used a rare data set with in-depth quantitative and qualitative data from nine public 
and private VC funds combining data obtained from a survey with investment 
managers and original deal documents like business plans, investment committee 
papers, reporting and annual statements. 
2. We provide an analysis of the Germany VC market which was rather moderately 
studied in literature before. Thereby, we shed light into the risk management practices 
of German VC funds. 
3. The results from our structural equation model imply that particularly investment 
manager´s experience and skills have a statistically significant impact to reduce failure 
risk in VC-backed ventures. This finding supports Hopp and Lukas (2014) who were 
among the first showing that investment managers can have technological, industry, 
financial and managerial experience and leadership skills which might be crucial for 
the success and failure ventures. Furthermore, governance mechanisms, e.g. 
milestones and reporting, were heavily applied by all VCC. However, contrary to other 
studies like Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008) we cannot show that 
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governance mechanisms have a significant effect on reducing the risk of venture´s 
failure.  
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Risk can be defined as the probability and severity of adverse effects (Aven, 2011). 
Therefore, risk management is crucial to manage the uncertainty of risks. A sound risk 
management is characterized as proactive, aligned and economic including the 
identification, estimation, evaluation, treatment and monitoring of possible negative 
influences on performance (Hain, 2011). VCC are financial intermediaries investing 
foremost in ventures bridging the gap created by the shortage of appropriate financing 
for small and entrepreneurial firms (LiPuma & Park, 2014; Okpala, 2012). By 
investing in ventures VCC bear high risk due to information asymmetries between the 
investor and entrepreneur known as the principal agent problem (LiPuma & Park, 
2014). Hence, VCC apply different types of risk management measures to reduce the 
risk of the investment. Risk management in VC-backed ventures was sparsely 
analyzed in academic literature (Tan et al., 2008; Yoshikawa et al., 2004). The studies 
of Kut et al. (2006), Kut et al. (2007), Smolarski et al. (2005) investigated how buy-out 
and VC funds in Europe overall, in India, UK, France and Germany manage risk in the 
pre-screening phase of the investment, in existing ventures, the portfolio risk and 
macro risk considering a comprehensive set of risk management measures. These 
studies showed first attempts to analyze a set of risk management measures. 
Nevertheless, the studies are subject to several limitations especially due to partially 
small samples.  
We conducted a structured literature review to study the current state of academic 
literature on the topic of risk management in VC-backed ventures. First, we analyzed 
all entrepreneurship journals ranked in the 55th edition of the Journal Quality List 
edited by Prof. Anne-Wil Harzing from 2005 to 2015 regarding the keywords “risk”, 
“risk management”, “venture capital” and “failure”. We identified thirteen relevant 
studies. Second, we searched in the EBSCOhost Online Research Databases for the 
abovementioned keywords in the titles and abstracts of all types of academic journals 
from 2005 to 2015. Overall, we identified 17 relevant papers (see Appendix 1). The 
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samples of the different studies vary greatly in size and data collection method. A 
considerable number of studies are of explorative nature due to partly small sample 
sizes. This implies that this field of research is relatively unexplored offering room for 
further research. The majority of papers used data from the US and in some cases parts 
of Europe or Asia. Only few studies were conducted in Germany.   
2.1 Risk types in VC-backed ventures  
VC investments are subject to several risks. Our structured literature review showed 
that academic scholars investigated agency risk, financial or liquidity risk, technology 
risk, market risk, human resources risk, internationalization risk and macro risk. In the 
following, the different types of risks are described. 
Agency risk is often stated as the major risk for VCC due potential problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard between entrepreneurs and VCC (Bengtsson & 
Sensoy, 2011; Lu et al., 2006; Tan et al., 2008). The theory was developed by William 
Meckling, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen depicting the conflict of interest between 
the principal and the agent, in the case of VC founders or managers of the venture and 
the VCC (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Mechanisms like 
financial contracting, milestones, gradual provision of capital and active involvement 
in the board are applied by venture capitalists to overcome the information asymmetry 
between the VCCs and the entrepreneur (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Lu et al., 2006; 
Tan et al., 2008).  
Liquidity or financial risks are partially used as synonyms in academic literature. Kut 
et al. (2006), Kut et al. (2007), Smolarski et al. (2005) classified financial risk in their 
analysis on the level of the portfolio and macro economy. Contrary, liquidity risk was 
analyzed by Cumming et al. (2005) indicating that VCC adjust their investment 
decisions according to liquidity risk. Liquidity risk refers according to Cumming et al. 
(2005) to the exit risk for the VCC in IPO markets describing the risk of not being able 
to reach an exit in a proper way. The study showed that VCC prefer to invest in high-
tech and early stage ventures to defer the exit and increases the syndication size 
(Cumming et al., 2005). In our analysis, we define liquidity or financial risk as the risk 
of the venture to become illiquid or even bankrupt. 
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Technology risk is often used synonymously as product risk, technological risk or 
technical risk in academic literature. Assessing the technology or product risk is 
crucial risk for VCC before investing in ventures due to the fact that technologies and 
products are often not market-ready. Technology due diligences, syndication and the 
opinions of investment managers with industry experience are used to overcome the 
risk associated with technologies and products (Kut et al., 2006; Kut et al., 2007; 
Smolarski et. al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012).  
Market risk is mainly related to the commercialization of a new technology (Wang et 
al., 2012). Ventures often lack the marketing capabilities necessary to take the 
technology to market (Wang et al., 2012). VCC apply due diligences to assess the 
market risk as a central part of the investment decision process (Lu et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, VCC utilize their network and skills to foster the market introduction. 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) major market risks are market size and 
growth, competition and barriers to entry and the likelihood of customer adoption. 
However, the results indicated that competition, market size and customer adoption 
risks mentioned at a moderate rate of 40, 31 and 22 per cent in the investment 
documents (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002). 
Human resources risks are risks associated with the quality and capabilities of the 
management of the venture. This was analyzed by the studies of Kut et al. (2006), Kut 
et al. (2007) and Smolarski et al. (2005). In these studies human resources risk was 
measured by the lack of management performance and the lack of management focus. 
To mitigate the risk related to the management, VCC can verify the track record of the 
management team and can invest in management teams which are previously known 
(Kut et al., 2007). Kaplan and Strömberg (2002) showed that risks associated with the 
management were mentioned in 61% of the analyses. It was documented that the CEO 
is a “difficult” person, that the management lacks in financial planning, the 
management is not able to focus or that the management is young and inexperienced 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002). In addition, a further risky issue for VCC is an 
incomplete management team (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002). Overall, the results 
indicate that risks associated with human capital are of high relevance for VCC. 
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LiPuma and Park studied the special topic of internationalization risk using 
longitudinal data of 962 invested rounds in 334 VC-backed ventures (LiPuma & Park, 
2014). Variables for risk management were round size, round interval and round 
syndication. Compared to solely domestic ventures, VCC use smaller syndicates and 
provide smaller and less frequent rounds of capital for ventures which internationalize 
opportunistically (LiPuma & Park, 2014).  
Volatility and macroeconomic drivers, namely macro risk, affect VC investments by 
the total amount, by the number of deals, and by the average amount per deal (Ning et 
al., 2015). Types of macro risk can be inflation risk, business-cycle risk, interest rate 
risk and foreign exchange rate risk (Kut et al., 2006). Therefore, in times of high 
macro risk VCC adapt their risk preferences and investment strategies by investing in 
fewer deals with a smaller average amount per deal, raising their investments in later 
investment stages and injecting a lower percent of cash in the first several financing 
sequences (Ning et al., 2015).  
Failure risk as one of the most severe risks for VCC was not contained in the results of 
our structured literature review. In a further search we explored that only very few 
researchers studied this topic empirically (Dimov & De Clercq, 2006). Therefore, we 
focused in our analysis on this type of risk since failure risk consists partially of the 
above mentioned risk types according to insolvency literature (Carter & van Auken, 
2006; Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Headd, 2003; Pinkwart, Kolb, & Heinemann, 
2015; Pleschak, Ossenkopf, & Wolf, 2002; Schilling, 2002), namely liquidity risk, 
market risk, human resources risk and technology risk. Therefore we include these risk 
factors as variables in our model to describe failure risk. 
2.2 Risk management in VC-backed firms  
The literature review has shown that VCC apply the following risk management 
measures: 1) assessment and evaluation of new ventures (Kut et al., 2007; Lu et al., 
2006), 2) governance (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Tan et al., 2008) and 3) contracting 
(Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Kut et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008). In the course of the 
interviews with practitioners we identified two further influencing factors to reduce 
risk in VC investments, investment manager´s experience and skills as well as 
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management support. There might be some interactions between the different risk 
management measures, e.g. governance mechanisms and management support. In the 
context of support functions of VCC governance mechanisms are a part of the support 
functions. However, in this context we separated governance mechanisms from 
management support due to the fact that governance mechanisms belong to the most 
important risk management measures in VC deals.  
Assessing and evaluating potential new investments are the first steps of risk 
management VCC can apply in the investment process. Kut et al. (2007) showed that 
risk management in evaluating new investments is a well-developed area in practice in 
the VC industry (Kut et al., 2007). VCC have a variety of tools to assess and evaluate 
potential investment targets regarding risk and return, e.g. performing different types 
of due diligences like financial, product, market, customer, legal, competitor analysis 
internally and externally and analyzing audited financial statements (Kut et al., 2007; 
Kut & Smolarski, 2006; Lu et al., 2006; Smolarski et al., 2005). Information 
asymmetries can for example be resolved through the overall coherence of the 
business plan and the VCC’s own due diligence report according to Tourani-Rad and 
England (2003). VCC can also check the risk associated with the management by 
verifying the track record of the management team and board members and performing 
criminal background checks (Kut et al., 2007; Kut & Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et 
al., 2005). Further measures to be conducted before an investment decision is made 
can be the consideration of synergies with existing ventures and the risk preferences of 
the investors of the fund (Kut et al., 2007; Kut & Smolarski, 2006; Smolarski et al., 
2005). We assume that a better assessment of the risk before investing might lead to a 
lower failure rate of VC-backed venture. 
Hypotheses 1: A high effort in assessing and evaluating the investment is negatively 
related to failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
Financial contracting can be used by VCC as a protection against downside risk 
(Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Kut et al., 2007; Tan et al., 2008), but also to generate 
value in portfolio companies by mitigating the agency problem with financial contracts 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2002). Financial contracting is one measure next to active 
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involvement (Kut et al. 2007) and direct monitoring to reduce information asymmetry, 
motivational and financials problems (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011). VCC apply 
financial contracting mechanisms like liquidation preference, anti-dilution rights, 
cumulative dividends, redemption rights, participation rights and pay-to-play 
provisions according to Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008). 
Syndication is a common measure in the VC industry to team up for assessing and 
investing collaboratively ventures to share the risk (Hopp, 2010; Hopp & Lukas, 2014; 
Smolarski et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2012). Staged financing is a useful control 
mechanism for VCC to gather information and monitor the progress of the venture 
having the option to inject further capital when milestones are reached and periodically 
abandon the venture (Kut & Smolarski, 2006; Tan et al., 2008). Adding to this, 
Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011) identified that good governance abilities can be a 
substitute for measures of financial contracting. Therefore, we state that a high use of 
contracting mechanisms might lower the risk of failure of VC-backed firms: 
Hypothesis 2: An extensive use of contracting mechanisms is negatively related to the 
failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
VCC are known as active investors in their ventures. Risk management mechanisms 
related to governance like milestones, reporting and an active involvement in the board 
are applied by VCC to reduce agency risk. This risk type describes the interest conflict 
in the relationship between the investor and the entrepreneur. A considerable amount 
of studies investigated how VCC use control and incentive mechanisms to enhance the 
firm’s performance and receive higher returns. Contrary, only a few studies focused on 
this topic to reduce downside or failure risk (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011; Tan et al., 
2008). According to Tan et al. (2008) governance risk management measures can be 
distinguished in either control mechanisms like monitoring (e.g. reporting, frequency 
of interaction, convertible securities), staged investments, which we allocated to 
financial contracting, and the allocation of ownership and control rights or incentive 
mechanisms (Tan et al., 2008). Shares of stock rights of the entrepreneur and 
employee stock options are incentive mechanisms to reduce agency risk. The greater 
VCC´s monitoring abilities, the more effective is the monitoring at constraining the 
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entrepreneur´s behavior (Bengtsson & Sensoy, 2011). From practice, we know that all 
VCC use control mechanism, hence we assume:  
Hypothesis 3: The extensive use of governance mechanisms are negatively related to 
the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
Investment managers are responsible for assessing new ventures and investment 
decisions in the pre-investment phase as well as the management of existing ventures 
in the post-investment phase, i.e. communication, meetings, controlling and supporting 
the venture. Investment managers can have technological, industry, financial and 
managerial experience and leadership skills which might be crucial for the success and 
failure ventures (Hopp & Lukas, 2014). According to Hopp and Lukas (2014) more 
experienced investment managers control their investments less often than less 
experiences investors. Furthermore, more industry experience allows less frequent and 
intense evaluation (Hopp & Lukas, 2014). Yazdipour and Constand (2010) argued that 
researchers cannot ignore the human/managerial/decision-making side in failure 
prediction. Hence, they suggest in human decisions about the making or breaking of a 
private company a shifts from the commerce/operational (effect) side of failure 
analysis to the human/managerial/decision making (cause) side of it (Yazdipour & 
Constand, 2010). We assume that an experienced investment manager can be better in 
assessing risk and using countermeasures which can lead to a lower failure risk of VC-
backed firms: 
Hypothesis 4: The degree of investment manager´s experience is negatively related to 
the failure risk of VC-backed ventures.   
A variety of studies proved that VCC add value to their portfolio companies 
(Alperovych & Hübner, 2013; Manigart et al., 2002; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza, 
Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996) by applying different types of value added services like 
financials, governance, strategy, operational improvements and human capital 
improvements (Bottazzi, Da Rin, van Ours, & Berglöf, 2002; Cumming et al., 2005; 
Guo & Jiang, 2013; Tang, Zhang, & Jun, 2014; Timmons & Bygrave, 1986). We 
transferred the positive effects from management support to the literature of risk 
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management in the VC industry. Hence, we assume that management support can have 
an impact on the failure risk of VCC´s portfolio companies: 
Hypothesis 5: The extensive use of management support provided by VCC is 
negatively related to the failure risk of VCC´s portfolio companies.   
3 Data and method 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of 93 VC-backed firms collected from nine different public and 
private public partnership VC funds in Germany. Considering the statistics of the 
Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften, which recorded 433 seed 
investments in Germany from 2005 to 2010, our sample covers 21.5% of the seed 
investments in this time frame in Germany. We conducted a survey with the 
corresponding investment managers. In addition, we had access to the original deal 
documents including the business plans, investment committee papers, reporting and 
annual statements of the investments. That enabled us to collect in-depth quantitative 
and qualitative data.  
Considering our data set, the VC-backed firms are on average 4.6 years old at the time 
of data collection. In the seed round the firms received on average 784,487 Euros as 
investment and in the series A round 1,202,948 Euros (see table 2). The firms in our 
data set are technology-based firms as they operate in the industries information 
technology and automation (39 %), life science (34%), material science (9 %), energy 
(5 %), communication (4 %) and others (9 %).  
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Variable  Mean Median Std. Dev 
Age of ventures  4.59 years 5 2.09 
Size of founders team  2.85 founders 3 1.13 
Number of founding 
rounds  
1.98 rounds  0.89 
Investment sum Seed  784,487 Euros 644,109 Euros 519,577 
Investment sum Series 
A  
1,202,948 Euros 816,287 Euros 1,179,085 
Number of investors 
Seed  
2.55 2 1.98 
Number of investors 
Series A  
3.94 3 2.54 
Table 1 Overview of our data set 
3.2 Measures and variables  
We used a structural equation model approach to build and test our model because 
failure risk can hardly be measured directly. Hence, we used a set of proxy variables. 
We built a partial least squares (PLS) model because of its suitability for proxy 
variables and the lack of existing scales in this field of research (Ainudding, Beamish, 
Hulland, & Rouse, 2007; Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). Furthermore, the fit of 
PLS models compared to covariance based methods for sample sizes smaller than 100 
also attributed to our choice (Fornell & Bookstein, 1982). Not all of our items follow 
normal distribution. Hence, they would have been omitted once using a covariance 
based approach. In PLS models items do not have to follow a certain distribution 
(Hulland, 1999). In addition, we use variables measured with a 5-point Likert scale in 
our model. PLS models support the use of nominal, ordinal and interval scaled data 
(Fornell & Bookstein, 1982, Nitzl, 2010; see also Brinckmann, McShane, Nair, & 
Rustambekov, 2011; Menzar & Nigh, 1995). We decided to use a reflective 
measurement model for the outer constructs of the risk management measures, the 
control variables and the construct of business failure as well as for the inner construct 
for two reasons. Reflective measurement models have defined reliability test criteria 
and are well researched (Roy & Tarafdar, 2012). Further, our indicator variables 
strongly correlate within our construct. 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
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Measuring failure risk of a company is difficult. Therefore, we measure failure risk by 
proxy variables, namely human resource risk, technology risk, financial risk and 
market risk based on the literature of bankruptcy and insolvency (Pinkwart, Proksch, 
Schefczyk, Fieger, & Ernst, 2015). Pinkwart et al. (2005) showed that 80 per cent of 
the reasons for failure include a lack of management companies or management 
companies. Other studies confirmed human resources as an important reason for 
business failure (Carter & van Auken, 2006; Headd, 2003). A further cause of failure 
is risk related to the technology of a venture (Schilling, 2002). These companies are 
dependent on developing their technology to a working and marked-proved product. If 
ventures do not succeed in reaching the market readiness in a timely manner 
development costs can grow in outstanding way which ventures often cannot afford 
(Pleschak et al., 2002). Difficulties in getting a follow-up financing, miscalculation for 
the capital need and bad planning are among the most common reasons for business 
failure, namely financial risk (Davila et al., 2003; Headd, 2003; Pleschak et al., 2002; 
Thornhill & Amit, 2003). New ventures often need too long to break even or even fail 
because of the lack of financial resources. A further reason for the failure of 
companies can be found in the area of the market. Problems with the market entry or 
in marketing and sales are among the most common reasons of failure (Dowling & 
Drumm, 2002; Pleschak, 2002; Wagner, 1994). This can be explained by a lack of 
experience in marketing and sales as well as an overoptimistic planning (Hall, 1992; 
Thornhill & Amit, 2003). In addition, new companies often rely on a few key clients 
leading to a strong dependency from these customers (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & 
Ziegler, 1996; Guggemoos, 2012). We measured the five above mentioned risk types 
by the assessment of the supervising investment managers on a scale from 1 to 5 (1: 
very low risk, 5: very high risk). 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
As mentioned in chapter 2.3.3 we identified five groups of risk management measures 
applied by VCC, i.e. assessment and evaluation of new ventures, contracting, 
governance, investment managers’ experience and skills and management support. 
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Each group was measured by different items since VCC use several risk management 
measures for each group comprehensively in practice.  
We used different items to measure the degree of assessment. We first looked if an 
external assessment of the company was done. From the VCC documents we knew 
that often external companies are hired to evaluate e.g. technology, market and legal 
risks. Further, we looked at the intellectual property protection. If the technology is 
protected by e.g. patents or registered designs the market and technology risks might 
be lower. In addition, we measured if the VCC relied on their network in assessing the 
technology and the competencies of the founders.  
Contracts handle different aspects of risks between the entrepreneur and the VCC. An 
important item is liquidation preference. A high liquidation preference lowers the risk 
of VCC as it minimizes possible losses. We analyzed how strongly a liquidation 
preference was used. Further, we measured the number of syndication partners. 
Syndication is a possibility to share risk with other investors. Further, we looked at the 
investment sum. If the investment sum is lower it might increase the risk of failure in 
terms of liquidity. In addition we intended to measure if staged financing was used. 
However, due to the fact that this was the case for all our cases we did not include this 
item in our model. 
Governance mechanisms like reporting and milestones are useful to assess risks 
continuously. To measure governance we included five proxy variables in our model. 
At first we looked if milestones were used and monitored. VCC often use milestones 
to bind founders to certain goals. If milestones are reached, founders receive the full 
investment sum. In addition, we looked at reporting. From expert interviews we knew 
that successful companies report regularly. If the company does not perform as 
expected, reporting rates might decrease. We therefore measured how heavily VCC 
rely on reporting. Furthermore, we included personal exchange in our model as it 
indicates a high interaction between founders and investment managers. Fourthly, we 
included the variable information through network in our model. According to 
principal agent theory a conflict exists between founders and VCC due to information 
asymmetry. Therefore, if VCC use their network to lower information asymmetries 
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risks might be reduced. Lastly, we investigated at the shares of the founders. If the 
founders still have a high share of equity they might be more motivated financially and 
incentivized even if they lost decision rights due to the contract with the VCC.  
Investment manager´s experience and skills might have a significant influence on the 
failure risk of ventures. We described the experience and skills of the investment 
manager by five variables. First, we looked at the working experience. More working 
experience might make it easier to deal in business environment. Second, we assessed 
the founding experience. Third, we analyzed the expertise with the field of technology. 
Forth, we assessed the business skills of the investment manager. An investment 
manager has to have a profound understanding of business to be able to evaluate the 
development of the ventures. Lastly, we analyzed the network size. With a superior 
network, the investment manager has more possibilities to get additional knowledge 
and support for areas he is not an expert on. 
We measured the degree of management support by six variables. Firstly, we looked at 
the support by the VCC using own competencies. Bringing in their experience in the 
company might lead to better development of the portfolio company. Further, we 
looked at sales support. Young companies often fail because of a lack of sales 
activities. A support in the area could possibly lead to a lower risk of failure. Thirdly, 
we analyzed support with technology. For new ventures technology is a crucial 
success factor. Fourthly, we examined strategic support. A strong strategy is often an 
indicator for successful firms. In addition, we looked at support in follow-up 
financing. For new ventures it is critical to raise additional financing in a timely 
manner to avoid illiquidity and bankruptcy. Lastly, we measured the use of network in 
general to lower the risk of the venture after the investment took place. Networks 
might be useful to get new customers or consultants for solving issues. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We controlled for age and industry. The risk of failure might be higher when 
companies are younger. Albach (1987) suggested that for most companies the highly 
probable chance of failure ends after five years. In addition, some industries might 
have higher failure rate than others. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 2. The failure risk 
was measures on a 5-point Likert scale (1: very low, 5 very high). The statistics show 
that liquidity risk has the highest value of 3.652 at the lowest standard deviation of 
1.152. Technology risk was rated on average at 2.711 depicting the lowest failure of 
risk measures, but at the highest standard deviation of 1.455.  
The descriptive statistics for the five groups of risk management present that 
governance mechanisms like milestones (mean = 4.247) or reporting (mean= 4.355) at 
a standard deviation of below 0.8 were deployed consistently high by the VCC in our 
sample. The same applies for risk management like obtaining references of founders 
(mean=4.086), liquidation preference (mean= 4.096) or support in follow up financing 
(mean= 4.065).  
4.2 Results of structural equation model 
The resulting path model is shown in table 2. The degree of assessment and evaluating 
new ventures has no significant influence on the failure risk. The t-statistic is not 
significant on a 95 per cent level for this construct. Therefore, we rejected H1.  
Looking at contracting, we found no significance due to low t-statistics. Hence, we 
rejected H2.  
Governance is not significant considering the low t-statistics. Therefore, we rejected 
H3. 
Our results show a high impact of investment manager´s experience and skills on 
failure risk of VC-backed firms. This is indicated by the high factor loading as well as 
the high value of the t-statistics. The connotation of the loading is negative stating that 
a high experience leads to low risk. Thus, we accepted H4.  
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Construct Loadings t-
Statistics 
Cronbac
h’s alpha 
Composit
e 
reliabilit
y 
AVE f² q² 
Assessment 
and 
evaluation of 
new ventures 
0.157 1.559 1 1 1 0.030 0.012 
Contracting 0.194 1.239 1 1 1 0.039 0.006 
Investment 
Manager´s 
experience 
and skills 
-0.273 2.046** 0.682 0.806 0.511 0.088 0.014 
Governance 
mechanisms 
-0.224 1.300 0.705 0.818 0.604 0.037 0.012 
Management 
support 
0.451 3.219** 1 1 1 0.241 0.053 
Failure risk - - 0.715 0.823 0.540   
Tables 2: Reliability measure of the PLS model 
 Significance of * 90 % level, ** 95 % level, *** 99 % level 
The control variables, age and industry, had no significant effect. We therefore 
removed them from the final model. 
4.3 Results of inner models 
In the following, we looked at the indicator variables of the single constructs. The 
indicator loadings and t-statistics are shown in table 4. Looking at the construct 
assessment and evaluating ventures the only significant variable was expert 
assessment. IP protection, references for technology and references for founders are 
not significant. Analyzing the construct contracting only liquidation preference is 
significant. We omitted the items syndication partner, investment sum and shares of 
investors. All items except of business skills were relevant when we looked at the 
construct investment manager´s experience and skills. In the construct governance 
mechanisms all variables were significant.  
Looking at the construct business failure all variables were significant and had a high 
factor loading. The factor loading was above 0.6 for all our variables which is an 
acceptable value (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013). This showed the validity of our 
approach to measure failure risk by using the four most important risks of bankruptcy. 
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Item Loadings t-Statistics Item Loadings t-Statistics 
Assessment 
and 
evaluation of 
new ventures 
  Management 
support 
  
Evaluation 1 - Use of Contacts 1 - 
Contracting   Failure   
Liquidation 1 - HR risk 0.624 3.695** 
Investment 
Manager´s 
experience 
and skills 
  Liquidity risk 0.775 9.426** 
Working 
experience 
0.797 2.258** Market risk 0.701 5.126** 
Founding 
experience 
0.705 2.957** Technology risk 0.823 7.904** 
Network size 0.623 1.976**    
Technology 
expertise 
0.722 2.066**    
Governance 
mechanisms 
     
Milestones 0.883 2.926**    
Information 
through 
network 
0.663 2.231**    
Reporting 0.770 2.828**    
Table 3: Loadings and t-statistics of the items 
Significance of * 90 % level, ** 95 % level, *** 99 % level 
4.4 Reliability measures 
We followed the framework of Hair et al. (2013) to assess the reliability of the PLS 
model. We therefore looked separately at the structural model and the measurement 
model.  
4.4.1 Reliability measures of structural model 
The R² of our model was 0.282 which is an acceptable value (Huber, Herrmann, 
Meyer, Vogel, & Vollhardt, 2007; Nitzl, 2010). The Q² value was greater than zero 
and therefore indicates a predictive relevance of the model (Henseler et al., 2009). The 
effect size of the constructs contracting, investment manager´s experience and skills, 
governance and support were above 0.02 showing a weak effect. The effect size of the 
construct assessment and evaluation of new ventures was below 0.02. This is not 
surprising as the t-test is not significant and the factor loading is below 0.2. The 
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predictive relevance for the construct investment manager´s experience and skills is 
weak stated by a value above 0.02. The value for predictive relevance for the 
constructs is below 0.02 indicating a low predictive relevance. We choose to include 
the constructs in the model due to the explorative nature of the study. 
4.4.2 Reliability measures of structural model 
Indicators with a loading below 0.4 were stepwise removed so that only indicators 
with a standardized indicator loading above this value were included in the model. 
This is an acceptable approach according to Henseler et al. (2009) and Hair et at. 
(2013). All indicators are significant on a 95 per cent level determined by the t-statics. 
The internal consistency reliability was measured by Cronbach’s alpha and composite 
reliability. The value for Cronbach’s alpha was above 0.6, which is permissible 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The composite reliability was above 0.7 for all the 
constructs (see table 1), which is an acceptable value (Henseler et al., 2009; Hair et al., 
2013). The average variance accepted (AVE) was used to measure the convergent 
validity. This approach is widely accepted in literature (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair 
et al., 2013). All the measures were above 0.5 showing an excellent value. We used 
Fornell-Larcker criterion results, cross loadings and heterotrait-monotrait ratio of 
correlations (HTMT) to test for discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; 
Ringle, Wende, & Becker, 2015). The model passed all three tests as described in the 
appendix (A2). 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Based on a structured literature review, the analysis of qualitative data of nine VC 
funds and an empirical analysis using a structural equation model we studied five 
groups of risk management measures VCCs can partake in their ventures to reduce 
failure risk. We empirically tested the relevance for each group of risk management 
measures. As a result, we show which risk management measures have an influence on 
business failure of VC-backed ventures. 
First, the assessment of the investment prior the decision had no significant influence 
to reduce the failure risk in VCC´s ventures in the model. Therefore, we cannot 
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support the studies of Kut et al. (2007), Kut and Smolarski (2006), Lu et al. (2006), 
Smolarski et al. (2005) and Tourani-Rad and England (2003) showing the significant 
relevance of assessment and evaluation in the pre-investment phase. One reason might 
be that this is often seen as the most important part in the investment decision process. 
The usage of different assessment methods was high for all cases in the sample (see 
descriptive statistics in A1), which confirm Kut et al. (2007) that risk management in 
evaluating new investments is a well-developed area in practice in the VC industry. 
However, the difference between the usages within the ventures might not be very 
high resulting in no significant influence.  
Second, the construct contracting is not significant. Hence, we cannot support the 
results of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2011), Kut et al. (2007) and Tan et al. (2008) that 
financial contracting can be used by VCC as a protection against downside risk. A 
reason for that could be that VCC use similar formats of contracting, which also can be 
seen in the descriptive statistics (A1). In addition, all VCC used staged financing, 
syndication and milestone with each venture. This implies no significant differences 
across the cases in the sample. 
Third, the results show that governance mechanisms are not significant to reduce 
failure risk in the model. The descriptive statistics showed that governance 
mechanisms are extensively used in all ventures supporting no significance of the 
statistical results (see A1). Considering this result, we cannot support Bengtsson and 
Sensoy (2011) and Tan et al. (2008) who found significant evidence for the importance 
of governance mechanisms in VC risk management. 
The construct investment manager´s experience and skills as a risk management 
measure in VC-backed ventures are significant, which was rarely discussed in 
literature before. This finding continuous the discussion of Hopp and Lukas (2014) 
who were among the first showing that investment managers have various 
competencies, skills and experiences which might be crucial for the success and failure 
ventures. Also the study of Yazdipour and Constand (2010) highlighted the importance 
of human capital in failure prediction of private firms. If the investment manager is 
more experienced the VC-backed ventures have less failure risk as the investment 
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manager might be able to uncover possible problematic issues earlier and use the right 
countermeasures. In addition, we found that also VC-backed ventures supported by 
investment managers with founding experience have a lesser risk of failure.  
Last, we found that management support is significant. Counter-intuitively, the 
connotation is negative. The extensive use of management support leads to a higher 
risk. This might be a chicken-and-egg problem. Possibly, investors only extensively 
support their portfolio companies when risk is already high which might be too late to 
save the company. To test this assumption we created a PLS model to analyze the 
influence of business failure on the degree of management support. We found that a 
high chance of business failure has a positive impact on the degree of management 
support as described by the use of VCC´s network and bringing external consultants 
into the portfolio company. Therefore, we can assume that this result might be 
explained by a chicken-egg problem. Considering this problem in the study, we 
recommend further investigation on the use of the risk management measures in the 
VC industry. It would be interesting to analyze if risk mitigation measures are only 
used when a risk occurred or also in a preemptive way. 
6. Limitations and implications 
6.1 Limitations  
Like most empirical studies the research is subject to several limitations. First, we 
could not assess all risk management measures identified in literature. A holistic 
model including further risk management measures could lead to additional results.  
Secondly, we used a self-assessment of the investment managers for their experience 
in a survey. This might introduce a possible bias. However, the survey covered a 
variety of different areas of VC financing wherefore it was not clear for the investment 
managers that a connection between their experience and the risk was made.  
Thirdly, we focused on German technology start-ups from public and private VC 
funds. It is unclear if the results can be generalized to other countries and all types of 
new ventures. Therefore, similar studies, e.g. using data in the US or Asia, might 
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uncover similarities and differences between risk management measures across 
countries.  
The data set consists of a higher share of public as well as public private partnership 
funds which also could include a possible bias as public funds might pursue a different 
investment and risk management strategy as private funds.  
The quantitative approach does not allow to further study changes in the perceived 
failure risk over time. A qualitative approach to explicitly study the development of 
the risks in different investment stages could further yield to new results. 
In addition, the use of PLS does not allow to control for endogeneity effects which is 
also discussed in current literature (Henseler, Dijkstra, & Sarstedt, 2014, Ronkko & 
Evermann, 2013).  
The results might be partially biased due to the fact that our sample includes VC 
investments from 2005-2010, i.e. during the financial crisis. It might be possible that 
risks were higher during that time because of the economic downturn and the restricted 
capital situation.  
6.2 Implications 
Our research has several implications for the literature and practice.  
In terms of the literature, the analysis has shown that the research stream of risk 
management in VC investments is rather underdeveloped, but nevertheless of great 
practical importance, for VCCs. We tested the effectiveness of different risk 
management measures on lowering the risk of business failure in new ventures. 
Thereby, we showed the importance of risk management on the probability of failure. 
With this article we aim to encourage discussions on and analyses of this field of 
literature to shed more light on VCC risk management practices. The results indicate 
the relevance of the investment manager in risk management in VC investments. 
Continuing this discussion, a possible research question could be which experiences, 
skills and knowledge as well as what kind of interaction between founders lowers 
venture´s failure risk. Another research direction might be a cross-country analysis as 
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there are several differences, e.g. legal, between European and US VCCs. The German 
law for asset management companies like VCC prohibits active involvement of the 
VCC in the portfolio firm. VCC are only allowed to provide advice which also impacts 
their risk management practices. Further one, a mixed method approach including, for 
example, surveys, verbal protocol analysis, and content analysis might be favorable to 
explore aspects of formal and informal risk assessment in VC investments. 
Furthermore, since our sample is limited to early stage VC funds, further 
investigations into different fund stages might be of interest to explore the differences 
across investment stages.  
In terms of practice, we showed that all VCC in our sample pursue comparable risk 
management measures for the assessment and evaluation of new ventures, in 
contracting as well as in governance issues. Looking at the descriptive statistics we 
observed that particularly governance mechanisms, liquidation preferences and 
partially assessment and evaluation measures are extensively applied by VCC in their 
ventures in our data set. Nevertheless, their mechanisms do not show a significant 
influence on failure risk, which might be explained by the fact that they act like 
hygiene factors. Our study provides empirical evidence for the great importance of 
investment manager´s experience and skills which could be understand as the 
motivator of the analyzed risk management. Considering our empirical results, LPs 
and VC funds should therefore rely on highly experienced employees managing 
ventures. The results suggest that VCC have to invest in their human capital to 
improve the skills and knowledge of their investment managers as well as the working 
environment and conditions to hire the best investment managers. In that course, an 
exchange between more experienced and younger investment managers triggered by 
the VCC might be a possibility to achieve a knowledge transfer. 
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Appendix A1: Overview of academic work on risk management in VC-backed ventures from 2005-2015 
Reference Sample Data collection method Data analysis method 
Bamford & 
Douthett (2013) 
Initial public offerings (IPO)                                                                 
n = 545  
Investors Daily Digest and 
Barron´s  
Descriptive statistics 
Logistic regression 
OLS estimation 
Bengtsson & 
Sensoy (2010) 
Private partnership VCs  
n = 646 
Start-up companies 
n = 1,266 
Investment rounds 
n = 1,534 
Private Consulting firm 
VCExperts 
Descriptive statistics 
Correlations 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
Probit regression 
OLS regression 
Heckman-Sorensen Index 
Cumming et al. 
(2005) 
Investment rounds 
n = 18,774 
VentureExpert Descriptive statistics  
Logit regression 
Poisson regression 
Comparison of proportions and means tests 
Correlations 
Hopp (2010) Capital contributions            
n = 2,373 (961 ventures and 437 
VCCs)       
Thomson Venture 
Economics 
Descriptive statistics 
Correlations 
Logistic regression 
Hopp & Lukas 
(2014) 
VC investments                                          
n= 2,373 in Germany 
Public sources and Thomson 
Venture Economics 
Descriptive statistics 
 Correlation matrix 
Weibull duration model 
Heckman type selection model     
Kut et al. (2007) Venture capital and buy-out funds 
n = 142 
Survey  Descriptive statistics 
Mann-Whitney test 
Pearson chi-square test 
Kut et al. (2006) Venture capital and buy-out funds 
n = 142 
Survey  Descriptive statistics 
Mann-Whitney test 
Pearson chi-square test 
Logit regression 
OLS regression 
Kut & Smolarski 
(2006) 
Private equity funds                                  
n = 33 from Germany and France                                                   
n = 21 from India 
Survey Descriptive statistics                                      
Mann Whitney test                                             
Pearson Chi-square test 
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LiPuma & Park 
(2014) 
Invested rounds                                     
n = 962                                                         
VC-backed technology companies                                                         
n = 334  
InfoUSA´s CorpTech data  Descriptive statistics  
Pearson Correlations 
GLS regression 
Poisson regression 
Lu et al. (2006) VC firms                                                                  
n = 34 
Questionnaire survey                                
EDB and AVCJ 
Descriptive statistics                                     
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon                         
Correlations                                                     
Two-sided Pearson chi-square                            
Hierarchical regression 
Maula, Autio, & 
Murray (2009) 
Technology-based firms                           
n = 91 
Venture Economics Database                 
Survey 
Descriptive statistics                              
Correlations                                                  
Standardized factor loadings                   
Goodness of fit statistics                  
Ning et al. 
(2015) 
Venture investments and deals 
n = 68  
Money Tree Report from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers/ 
National Venture Capital 
Association using data from 
Thomson Reuters 
Descriptive statistics 
Correlations 
Multiple regression models 
Payne, Davis, 
Moore, & Bell 
(2009) 
VC firms 
n = 26 
VC investors 
n = 52 
Survey  Descriptive statistics 
Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings  
Correlations 
GLS regression 
Multivariate regression 
Pbrimah & 
Prakash  (2010) 
VC firms                                                         
n = 584 
Jay Ritter´s                                                     
VentureXpert 
Descriptive statistics                    
Tobit regression                                           
OLS regression                                                 
Variance-covariance matrix 
Smolarski et al. 
(2005) 
Private equity funds                           
n = 32 from UK            
n = 21 from India 
Survey Descriptive statistics 
Mann-Whitney test 
Pearson chi-square test 
Tan et al. (2008) VC firms 
n = 53 
Survey Descriptive statistics 
Wang et al. 
(2012) 
VC-backed companies                                   
n = 1,757 (772 reporting sales 
information)                                                      
Financing rounds                                         
VentureXpert                                          
Alliances database 
Descriptive statistics                                     
Correlations                                                    
Regression analysis (OLS, negative binomal model) 
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n = 5,896 (1,757 VC-backed 
companies) 
Table 4: Overview of academic work on risk management in VC-backed ventures from 2005-2015 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive data of dependent and independent variables 
 Mean Std. Dev Scale Data Source 
Failure risk     
HR risk 3.200 1.317 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Liquidity risk 3.652 1.152 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Market risk 3.311 1.304 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Technology risk 2.711 1.455 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Assessment and 
evaluation 
    
Expert assessment 3.795 0.915 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
IP protection 3.435 1.424 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
References of technology 3.806 1.002 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
References of founders 4.086 0.686 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Contracting     
Liquidation preference 4.096 0.990 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Number of syndication 
partners 
2.568 1.975 Metric Term sheet 
Investment sum 436,169 206,874 Metric (Euros) Investment committee 
papers 
Investment manager 
experience and skills 
    
Working experience 3.311 0.932 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Founding experience 3.237 0.993 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Technology expertise 3.355 0.842 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Business skills 3.946 0.578 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Network size 3.720 0.851 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Governance     
Milestones 4.247 0.789 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Information through 
network 
4.323 0.710 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Reporting 4.355 0.653 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Shares of Founder 83.30 8.830 Per cent Term sheet 
Personal exchange 4.323 0.710 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Management support     
Support with competence 3.554 0.881 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
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Support with sales 2.681 0.987 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with technology 2.304 1.117 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with strategy 3.839 0.664 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Support with follow-up 
financing 
4.065 1.046 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Use of network 3.785 0.900 Rating from 1 to 
5 
Survey with investment 
managers 
Control     
Age 4.598 2.086 Metric Business Plan 
Industry – IT 0.385 0.473 Binary Investment committee 
papers 
Industry – Life Science 0.344 0.463 Binary Investment committee 
papers 
Industry – Material 
Science 
0.098 0.177 Binary Investment committee 
papers 
Industry – Energy 0.057 0.108 Binary Investment committee 
papers 
Industry – 
Telecommunication 
0.041 0.079 Binary Investment committee 
papers 
Industry – Other 0.090 0.164 Binary Investment committee 
papers 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
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Appendix A3: Discriminant validity 
In table 6, the Fornell-Lacker criterion is shown. The table shows the latent variable 
correlation. In the diagonal the square root of the AVE can be found. This value 
should be higher than all values below and left in the table to pass the discriminant 
validity. This is the case for our model. 
 Failure 
risk 
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
Contracting Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
Governance Management 
support 
Failure risk 0.735      
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
0.225 1.000     
Contracting 0.361 0.214 1.000    
Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
-0.183 0.130 -0.158 0.715   
Governance 0.201 0.298 0.435 -0.050 0.777  
Management 
support 
0.383 0.304 -0.416 0.197 0.641 1.000 
Table 6: Fornell-Lacker Criterion 
In table 7, the cross loadings of each item in our PLS model are shown. Each variable 
should load highest on its corresponding construct. Then, the discriminant validity test 
is passed. This is the case in our model. 
 Failure 
risk 
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
Contracting Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
Governance Management 
support 
Failure risk       
HR risk 0.624 0.006 0.019 -0.199 -0.126 0.046 
Liquidity risk 0.775 0.105 0.338 -0.222 0.184 0.245 
Market risk 0.701 0.297 0.353 0.071 0.241 0.339 
Technology 
risk 
0.823 0.212 0.259 -0.202 0.187 0.380 
Assessment 
and 
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evaluation 
Evaluation 0.234 1.000 0.214 0.130 0.298 0.304 
Contracting       
Liquidation 0.361 0.214 1.000 -0.158 0.435 0.416 
Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
      
Working 
experience 
-0.137 0.177 -0.080 0.797 0.127 0.290 
Founding 
experience 
-0.159 0.078 -0.256 0.705 -0.292 -0.174 
Network size -0.110 -0.018 0.007 0.623 0.096 0.291 
Technology 
expertise 
-0.106 0.123 -0.068 0.722 -0.001 0.261 
Governance       
Milestones 0.227 0.161 0.414 -0.056 0.883 0.476 
Information 
through 
network 
0.098 0.349 0.181 0.015 0.663 0.577 
Reporting 0.114 0.304 0.366 -0.055 0.770 0.541 
Management 
support 
      
Use of 
network 
0.383 0.304 0.416 0.197 0.641 1.000 
Table 7: Cross-Loadings 
In table 8, the heterortrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (HTMT) is shown. If the 
HTMT is below 0.900 discriminant validity has been established between two 
constructs. This is the case for all of our items. 
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 Failure 
risk 
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
Contracting Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
Governance Management 
support 
Failure risk       
Assessment 
and 
evaluation 
0.249      
Contracting 0.390 0.214     
Investment 
manager 
experience 
and skills 
0.332 0.168 0.174    
Governance 0.342 0.407 0.481 0.271   
Management 
support 
0.407 0.304 0.416 0.430 0.797  
Table 8: Heterortrait-Monotrait Ratio Criterion 
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Value-adding activities of German venture capital companies: A content analysis 
of investors’ original documents 
As many studies have shown, venture capital companies pursue value-adding activities 
for their portfolio firms to achieve abnormal returns compared to the market. Value-
adding activities are complex and highly diverse, but also are very relevant to practice. 
Hence, the topic has been considerably analyzed in academic literature. However, in-
depth knowledge is still lacking owing to the sensitivity and scarcity of publicly 
available data from venture capital companies. We provide in-depth details into the 
practices of venture capital companies. Using a longitudinal data set obtained from 
nine venture capital companies in Germany, we qualitatively analyzed the companies’ 
value-adding activities. Drawing on investors’ original documents, including business 
plans, investment committee papers, reports and annual statements of the investments, 
we created a typology of which value-adding services were performed. Results suggest 
that, consistent with prior studies, venture capital companies are highly engaged in 
supporting ventures with respect to financial and human capital issues as well as in 
establishing strong governance mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries 
between founders and investors. Further, support through venture capital companies’ 
network of relevant contacts is moderately applied. Support for operational issues is of 
low relevance.  
Keywords: venture capital; non-financial value-added; non-financial contributions; 
value creation; new venture 
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Introduction 
New technology-based firms are an important accelerator for innovation activity and 
growth in economies. However, a major bottleneck for the evolution and growth of 
start-ups is the availability of capital. Fortunately, venture capital (VC) is an especially 
widespread and developed form for financing new and innovative businesses. This 
financing type for start-ups bridges the gap created by the scarcity of long-term 
favorable financing that is considered appropriate for small firms (Okpala 2012). VC 
investments are high-return investments in small, high-risk firms (Lam 1991). A 
variety of empirical studies showed that VC-backed firms perform better than non-
VC-backed firms (Barry and Mihov 2013; Bessler and Seim 2012; Chiampou and 
Kallett 1989; Dagogo and Ollor 2009; Di Guo and Jiang 2013; Robinson 1987; 
Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and Müller 2013), that VC IPOs generate positive returns 
after the IPO (Bessler and Seim 2012), and that VC backing is associated with 
efficiency gains and successful exits (Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy 2011; Nahata 
2008).  
The main purpose of venture capital companies (VCCs) is the provision of capital for 
young, entrepreneurial ventures. However, VCCs earn abnormal returns compared to 
the market – a phenomenon that cannot be explained solely by the capital provision. 
Empirical studies have shown that VCCs provide supporting functions for innovative 
start-ups and have mechanisms to overcome the problem of information asymmetries 
(Alperovych and Hübner 2013; Di Guo and Jiang 2013; Fleming 2004; Sapienza 1992, 
1996). High returns are influenced by screening and value-adding effects (Di Guo and 
Jiang 2013), and value-adding activities can be an important driver of VC-backed 
firms’ performance (Alperovych and Hübner 2013). Two studies have identified that 
high involvement of VCCs has a positive correlation with positive returns (Sapienza 
1992, 1996).  
Despite prior studies that led to notable empirical results and contributed to the topic 
of VC, in-depth knowledge is still lacking as to how and to what extent VCCs in 
different countries conduct value-adding activities. Germany has besides the UK and 
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France the most relevant and largest VC market in Europe and is a hub for high-tech 
start-ups. However, owing to varying legal systems, entrepreneurial cultures, risk 
aversion, and degrees of professionalization, VC markets’ characteristics differ across 
countries. The German legal and tax systems for VCCs and VC funds differ from 
those in the US and the UK, and deal sizes in Germany are smaller and VCCs are not 
as professionalized as US VCCs. UK and US VCCs are the most involved in their 
ventures and add the most value compared to other European countries (Sapienza et al. 
1996). Thus, a reasonable assumption is that value-adding activities might be 
performed differently in Germany.  
In our study, we analyze VCCs’ value-adding activities to create a holistic typology 
considering the specifics of the German market. In that effort, using content analysis to 
study investors’ original documents we qualitatively assessed various types of value-
adding activities applied by German VCCs. However, we do not investigate how 
VCCs’ involvement affects the new venture’s performance. The paper makes four 
contributions: 
(1) The study provides in-depth insights into the question of what kinds of value-
adding activities VCCs apply in their ventures. 
(2) The study reflects rare access to detailed VC information in that we obtained a 
unique, longitudinal data set from nine public and private VCCs in Germany that 
encompassed data of 95 VC-backed ventures. This data set led to 587 qualitative 
quotations on the topic of value-adding activities. 
(3) We created a typology of value-adding activities enabling a holistic view of what 
activities VCCs perform, continuing the research theme initiated by Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) and Sapienza et al. (1996).  
(4) The results confirm prior studies stating that VCCs support in the areas of 
financial, strategic, governance, and operational improvements and through 
networks, as well as in human capital issues. However, VCCs mainly apply 
financial, governance and human capital value-adding activities (Sapienza et al. 
1996). In contradiction to established literature (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; 
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MacMillan et al. 1989; MacMillan et al. 1989; Maula, Autio, and Murray 2005), 
operational improvements are of low relevance in this study.  
Literature analysis  
VCCs exercise strong fundamental skills in selecting and monitoring their portfolio 
companies, setting the foundation for their superior investment performance 
(Achleitner, Engel, and Reiner 2013), and the value-creation measures or value-adding 
activities applied by VCCs have received increasing attention in academic literature.  
Academic scholars have investigated whether VCCs apply different types or 
comprehensive sets of value-adding activities in their portfolio companies. Agarwal 
and Chatterjee (2007) showed that VC-backed firms are more successful owing to 
VCCs’ entrepreneurial skills, motivations, and strategy. Cumming, Fleming, and 
Suchard (2005) identified that VCCs pursue financial, administrative, marketing, and 
strategic/management value-adding activities. Large and Muegge (2008) showed that 
operating, outreach, consulting, mentoring, and recruiting are the most influential 
categories for creating value in VC-backed firms. The results of MacMillan et al. 
(1989) suggested four distinct areas of involvement: development and operations, 
management selection, personnel management, and financial participation.  
Prior studies have shown that some value-adding activities are commonly applied 
across VCCs with respect to financial, strategic, governance, operational, network, and 
human capital improvements. Therefore, we focus on these value-creation levers in 
our analysis. 
Financial improvements 
The main sources for return generation in VC-backed firms are financial 
improvements such as capital infusion and helping to raise further capital to overcome 
financial constraints (Alperovych and Hübner 2013). VC is effective in helping young, 
innovative firms to overcome credit constraints (Bottazzi et al.2002), and the 
involvement of VCCs in start-ups leads to raising more capital (Chang 2004; Gorman 
and Sahlman 1989).  
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Strategic improvements 
The topic of strategic value-adding activities has so far been moderately discussed by 
academic scholars in the context of VCC activities. According to Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989), one of the activities most frequently performed by portfolio 
companies is to assist in creating strategic analyses. Owing to active involvement of 
the board, VCCs support strategy formulation and revision in their portfolio firms 
(Rosenstein 1988). In fact, VCCs’ strategic involvement is their most important role 
(Sapienza, Manigart, and Verme 1996). Prior work has found that VCCs help to 
improve new ventures’ strategy when daily pressures on the management of the start-
up lead to postponement of this task (Timmons and Bygrave 1986), although other 
research did not find statistically significant support for strategic information provided 
by VCCs (Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel 2004).  
Governance improvements 
VCCs are active investors and add value to their portfolio companies owing to their 
active involvement (Alperovych and Hübner 2013). VCCs apply mechanisms like 
milestones, gradual provision of capital, and active involvement in the board to 
overcome the information asymmetry between investors and founders. The level of 
monitoring and control depends on the percentage of equity VCCs hold, as well as the 
percentage of seats on a new firm's board of directors held by VCC (Barney et al. 
1989). Studies have shown that VCCs monitor, control, and actively manage their 
investments (Alperovych and Hübner 2013). When risk is higher, VCCs are more 
likely to try to structure the deal in a way to exercise close monitoring and control over 
the new venture (Barney et al. 1989). Reporting requirements are eclectic, but a shift 
seems to be occurring toward greater use of quarterly reporting and portfolio valuation 
as well as more frequent direct contact between VCCs and their limited partners 
(Robbie, Wright, and Chiplin 1997).  
An important way in which VCCs add value non-monetarily is by serving as a director 
on the board (Rosenstein et al. 1993). In VC-backed firms, the board is typically small 
and controlled by outsiders, and the presence of the VCC increases the frequency of 
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independent board members (Brunninge and Nordqvist 2004). As some of the outside 
members often have a high degree of experience and a close relationship with the 
management (Rosenstein 1988), the VCC can significantly improve the 
professionalism and independence of the board of directors (Tang et al. 2014). One 
study showed that the level of monitoring and control depends on the level of business 
and agency risk associated with investing in a new firm (Barney et al. 1989).  
Operational improvements 
Academic literature shows that VCCs’ activism has an influence on growth, 
profitability, efficiency, employment, and innovation activity of the entrepreneurial 
firm. Examples of operational value-adding services are giving advice regarding the 
technology (Maula, Autio, and Murray 2005), formulating marketing plans 
(MacMillan et al. 1989), developing production or service techniques (MacMillan et 
al. 1989), and operational planning (Gorman and Sahlman 1989). VC-backed firms are 
able to extract more interest from optimization of the operating cycle (Alperovych and 
Hübner 2013). VCCs’ involvement supports the effects of technology 
commercialization on the performance of new ventures (Chen 2009), which might be 
due to VCCs’ entrepreneurial experience, manpower, and creativity (Chen and Chang 
2013). VC-funded firms have a higher number of patent applications (Engel and 
Keilbach 2007), and they can push toward building absorptive capacity and more 
permanent in-house R&D efforts (Prelipcean and Boscoianu 2008).  
Support through networks 
The provision of networks is one of the most value-adding activities of VCCs since 
venture capitalists exploit their networks to find potential partners, clients, and 
suppliers (Alperovych and Hübner 2013). The impact of networks on success has been 
demonstrated empirically (Bellavitis, Filatotchev, and Kamuriwo 2014; Hochberg et 
al. 2007). Furthermore, networking through contacts to other firms and professionals 
has been rated as an important success driver in venture capital-backed firms 
(Sapienza, Manigart, and Verme 1996). However, networking is not as important as 
financial and strategic support. VCCs also improve governance by using their 
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networks to recruit specialized independent directors with industry experience 
(Suchard 2009).  
Support in human capital issues 
One of the most frequently performed activities for VC-backed firms is management 
recruiting (Gorman and Sahlman 1989) and, related, the overall improvement of 
human capital of new firms (Hellmann and Puri 2002). VCCs support their portfolio 
companies in finding key management team members (Timmons and Bygrave 1986) 
or replacing the founder with an outside CEO (Hellmann and Puri 2002). Furthermore, 
as VCCs have significant experience in investment, industry, consulting, and 
entrepreneurship (Alperovych and Hübner 2013), these skills can be transferred to the 
portfolio companies to further develop venture managers’ skills. Entrepreneurial 
experience, manpower, and creativity have a positive impact on the new venture’s 
performance in terms of profitability and patent creation (Chen and Chang 2013), and 
the coaching function is important to drive growth in portfolio companies (Colombo 
and Grilli 2009). Interpersonal roles such as the mentor role add value in VCCs’ 
portfolio companies (Sapienza, Manigart, and Verme 1996).  
Regardless of value-adding activities’ great importance and positive effects on a new 
venture´s performance, some studies have shown that venture capital investments do 
not outperform the market (Achleitner, Engel, and Reiner 2013; Becsky-Nagy, Balázs, 
and Fazekas, 2014; Brau, Brown, and Osteryoung 2004; Florou 2005; Kirkulak 2008). 
This finding might be partially explained by the negative effects of VCCs’ 
involvement, especially with the governance mechanism, which requires a lot of time 
for the founder and reduces the founder´s resources for focusing on the core activities 
to develop the venture. Furthermore, VCCs are often not experts in the industry or the 
technology the venture is operating in. Hence, their involvement and suggestions can 
be counterproductive for the venture.  
Data and method 
Our sample consists of 95 VC-backed firms, and the data were collected from nine 
public and private VC funds in Germany. The companies were financed between 2005 
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and 2010. Our sample covers 21.9% of the seed investments in Germany in this time 
frame according to the statistics of the Bundesverband Deutscher 
Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften (the German venture capital association), which 
recorded 433 seed investments in Germany from 2005–2010. We had direct access to 
investors’ original documents, such as business plans, investment committee papers, 
and regular reporting and annual statements of the investments. This access enabled us 
to collect in-depth qualitative data regarding the value-added activities as well as 
general quantitative data about the investments, such as the investment sums and 
number of investors. 
The VC-backed firms in our data set were on average 4.6 years old at the time of data 
collection. In the seed round, the firms received on average €784,487 as investment 
from 2.55 investors and in the Series A round €1,202,948 from 3.94 investors (Table 
1). Firms in our data set are technology-based firms as they operate in the industries of 
information technology and automation (38 %), life science (34 %) and material 
science (10%), energy (5 %), communication (4 %) and others (9 %).  Descriptive 
statistics of our data set appear in Table 1. 
---Please insert Table 1 about here--- 
 We relied on content analysis to determine what kind of value-adding activities 
VCCs use to create value in their portfolio firms. This method entails a systematic 
approach to reading a body of texts, images, tables and symbols, not essentially from 
an author´s or user´s perspective (Krippendorff 2013). We decided to employ this data 
collection approach because we observed that the majority of studies in this research 
stream used surveys, interviews, or databases to collect data (e.g., Bellavitis, 
Filatotchev, and Kamuriwo 2014; Fried and Hisrich 1995; Knyphausen-Aufseß 2005; 
Saetre 2003; Steier and Greenwood 1995). However, these types of data collection are 
subject to several limitations. In most cases, the response rate of surveys or interviews 
is rather low, which reduces the relevance of the study because it represents only a 
small share of the whole population. In addition, survey or interview responses are 
subject to several biases, such as being socially desirable answers or not measurable by 
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standardized scales. Databases are limited in their degree of detail because they are 
primarily based on publicly available data and thus do not offer data on internal 
practices of VCCs. However, collecting data is consistently difficult in VC research. 
This is especially the case for value-adding activities, the VC investment selection 
process, and performance data since they are among the most sensitive data of VCCs. 
In addition, start-ups are less obliged to publish company data than large corporations, 
which also increases the difficulty of gathering data on VC deals. 
As mentioned above, we analyzed the original deal documents of the VCCs in our 
sample. To ensure a high reliability of our approach we used investigator triangulation 
(Krippendorff 2004). In total, we analyzed more than 500 documents. In multiple 
encoding rounds, we discussed our results and removed any quotations that could not 
be directly tied to value-adding activities.  
To organize and structure the data, we used the Gioia methodology (Gioia et al., 
2012). In the first step, we read the documents multiple times. Three researchers 
developed codes based on the documents’ content to find reiterated patterns of 
meaning. While creating codes, we educed a coding scheme that relied on thematic 
analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006), which is useful to identify, analyze, and report data 
patterns or categories. The main benefit of this analysis is that it structures and 
describes the data set in great detail. The identified codes were then collected and 
organized into the first-order categories (Gioia et al., 2012), which we separated into 
subcategories. We deleted the less relevant topics to refine the codes once more (Flick, 
2015), which resulted in the second-order analysis (Gioia et al., 2012). Last, we 
aggregated the second-order themes into the final dimensions.  
We conducted a pre-test with three VCCs, collecting data for nine ventures. We used 
this pre-test to find out which documents to use to document possible value-adding 
activities and created a coding scheme. To ensure the anonymity of the ventures in our 
sample, we substituted the names of the ventures and persons with general terms and 
indicated that by using square brackets. Quotations were translated from German to 
English. 
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Results 
In total, we identified 587 mentions of value-adding activities in the documents. Of all 
the mentions, 35% referred to the decision paper and 32% referred to the reporting of 
the venture. In addition, in 28% of VCCs reported their value-adding activities in the 
board meetings. Other documents account for only a small proportion of the overall 
mentions. Table 2 summarizes which risks are described in which documents. In the 
following discussion, the findings in each category of value adding activities are 
described. 
---Please insert Table 2 about here--- 
Financial improvements 
While analyzing financial improvements we were able to identify 108 relevant quotes 
in the documents. The support in follow-up financing belongs to one of the most 
mentioned categories of value-adding activities in the documents. As the following 
quotes show, VCCs are highly involved in the preparation, organization, and 
negotiation of follow-up financing. 
Preliminary talk with the management about a follow up financing. The 
[investment manager] made clear that the precondition for a further financing 
round is reaching a revenue target (e.g., 10 million Euros). 
The investors are in final negotiations with a [business angel]. The fund 
management expects the closing of the next financing round with [business 
angel] on [date]. 
We saw that often portfolio companies were not able to find follow-up financing in the 
predefined time frame. Therefore, bridge financing was provided to ensure the survival 
of the company.  
Because of the low liquidity, investors except [investor 1] and [investor 2] 
decided to conduct a bridge financing although the company failed to reach the 
last milestone. 
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We pay the urgent bill of [venture] (2nd warning) in advance of our next 
payment; therefore an agreement with [venture] will be made today. From now 
on, weekly visits of [venture] are necessary to check liabilities and resolve 
conflicts. 
Further, VCCs were highly involved in the preparation of a possible exit. To that end, 
VCCs helped in identifying and evaluating potential exit channels. 
A meeting with the management of [potential exit partner] will be held on 
[date]. An agenda should be created together with [investment manager] and 
[investment manager] should join the [management] (for the meeting). 
Visit of [potential exit partner] to evaluate an exit option. Result: Investment 
manager and management think that they should position the company as 
exclusive partner. 
In addition, VCCs assisted ventures in creating realistic financial planning and 
budgets.´ 
Possible goals and strategies for next year were discussed with [manager 1] 
and [manager 2]. [manager 1] will think about it and create a budget plan [for 
new strategic partner]. 
Strategic improvements 
In the deal documents, we identified 177 mentions of strategic improvements induced 
by VCCs. VCCs supported their ventures primarily in the overall business as well as 
through sales strategy. The forums for this type of support were usually strategy 
meetings. A meeting´s results were often presented and discussed in the board 
meetings. Afterwards, the board approved the strategy, provided further ideas for 
strategic directions, or highlighted deficits of the venture´s strategic development.  
In considering the overall business strategy, VCCs discussed potential strategic 
directions of the venture, such as cost leadership or niche and mass strategies. VCCs 
used scenario analysis to evaluate potential strategic growth directions together with 
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the management of the venture. In addition, the deal documents identified value 
drivers for the investment.  
The investment manager supports the targeted strategy establishing the brand 
as cost leader in the respective market. 
[Manager 1] and [Manager 2] informed the audience regarding potential 
growth scenarios which can be found in the presentation. The management is 
going to develop these scenarios further and plans to present the outcome at the 
shareholder´s meeting. 
Since sales strategy was mentioned relatively often in the deal documents it can be 
assumed that this is an important issue for VCCs and that they regularly intervene. The 
analysis has shown that new ventures developed the sales concept in cooperation with 
the VCCs. VCCs also gave advice if sales processes could be optimized, if a sales 
department needed to be restructured, or if sales partnerships should be intensified or 
even closed.  
The existing sales partnership should be reviewed, adapted and cancelled if 
necessary. 
Due to the low sales performance the venture has to restructure the sales 
department in [year]. 
We found mentions that in some cases, VCCs recommended buy and build strategies. 
They discussed with the venture’s management team whether a buy and build strategy 
was a worthwhile direction for the venture, and searched with the venture for potential 
targets, evaluating these with respect to opportunities and threats. VCCs also 
supported the checking of purchase contracts with respect to critical terms.  
The idea of a buy and build strategy was analyzed in cooperation with 
[investment manager]. The management of [venture] and [investment manager] 
are currently not finding any potential targets. They agreed to keep this idea in 
mind. 
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The analyses indicate that VCCs sometimes supported their ventures regarding their 
market entry strategy. This can be the case for either the overall market entry or the 
market entry in new countries. VCCs recommended whether, when, and how a market 
entry was sensible for the venture. In this regard, the respective sales strategy was also 
part of the discussion. 
The investment committee evaluates the market entry in other countries without 
any personal presence as critically due to the restricted financial budget for this 
industry. 
Governance improvements 
With 124 relevant codings, governance-related involvement of VCCs belongs to the 
most often mentioned value-adding activities in the documents. VCCs in our sample 
used contracting to ensure their governance rights. Seats on the board and regular 
information about the status of the company are defined in contracts. 
[VCC1] and [VCC 2] have the right to place a board member and also to send 
a guest. 
Referring to §5 of the constitution of [venture] the operating plan has to be 
approved by the supervisory board. 
Our results showed that VCCs used milestones to control their portfolio companies 
and to ensure a positive development of the venture. A milestone agreement can take 
the following form:  
Milestones are: 1. 243,233 Euros at the signing of the contract and registering 
the shared capital increase in the trade register, 2. 121,617 with gaining at 
least 12 customers with signed contracts by [date 1]. 135,150 with gaining at 
least 18 customers with signed contract by [date 2] or earning a cumulated 
revenue of at least 500,000 Euros by [date 3]. 
However, we observed that in practice, milestones were frequently not reached. As a 
consequence, VCCs often had to change the deadline or even cancel the milestone to 
ensure the venture’s survival.  
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The milestone was postponed in agreement with the board and [VCC 1] and 
[VCC 2] as hiring a chief financial officer was not possible in time. 
The milestone for [company] is not reachable anymore. [VCC 1] and [VCC 2] 
nevertheless decided to further support [company]. The support of the other 
investors, however, is a must. Discussions will start soon. 
We identified that the quality of ventures’ reporting was critical, and was not sufficient 
in several cases. Hence, VCCs forced ventures to improve their reporting. 
The reporting is working only slowly and we strongly advice to send it in time. 
The new reporting guidelines should be implemented in the following month.´ 
The management only provides very little information. We strongly advise to 
work closer together. 
Operational improvements 
We found 11 quotations in the area of operational improvements. Sometimes 
operational issues were discussed in board meetings. VCCs seemed to actively engage 
in the venture only if a critical issue was apparent or if the venture was close to 
bankruptcy. Even in these situations, it was not uncommon to hire external advisors. 
The management of [venture] has declared temporary bankruptcy. The fund 
management is discussing countermeasures with the management of [venture] 
to ensure its survival. 
The situation of [venture] is very difficult and the management of [VCC 1] has 
hired a [consultant] to support the venture. 
In rare cases, we found recommendations that were operational: 
The investment committee suggests integrating a customer satisfaction form 
into the ordering process. 
A new design of the website is discussed as project for the future. [Investment 
manager] recommends giving the redesign of website, flyers and letterheads to 
one agency to ensure a consistent design with recognition value. [Investment 
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manager] suggests contacting [company] – we had good experience in the past 
in designing a corporate identity with this agency. 
In addition, we saw that VCCs provided support in the creation of contracts and legal 
issues. However, in this case VCCs relied primarily on external partners. 
Call of investment manager with [patent layer] to discuss the possible license 
contract with [potential seller of products]. 
Support through networks 
For support through networks, we found 39 mentions in our sample. VCCs often have 
large networks of consultants, advisors, coaches and industry experts that the venture 
can draw on.  
Our results suggest that VCCs exploited their network to find further co-investors for 
follow-up financing. In this context, VCCs contacted potential investors and conducted 
negotiations for the venture. Furthermore, VCCs recommended which investor might 
be the best choice for the venture.  
 [VCC 1] is going to provide [the venture] further useful contacts to financial 
and strategic investors. 
We identified that some VCCs made contacts to potential new customers for the 
venture. Owing to a VCC´s reputation, the business deal might be more likely for a 
start-up that is unknown and new at the market. This finding is especially relevant for 
the market entry to find first reference customers. 
Existing market contacts were intensified finding first strategic partners to 
bring the software into the market. 
We are going to make the following reference calls for the venture. 
In our sample, a few VCCs used their networks to find potential original equipment 
managers or distributors for their ventures. First, VCCs recommended which 
companies might be potential sales partners and made contact with them. Second, they 
supported the negotiations and cooperation with the sales partners. In addition, we 
observed that VCCs helped to develop provisional models for sales partners.  
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[VCC 1] recommends searching for a new distributor at the US east coast. 
Furthermore, [investment partner] suggests getting in contact with an industry 
expert to evaluate the sales problems, but also the potential in the US. 
[Investment partner] is going to contact [company 1], [company 2] and 
[company 3] in order to support the sales initiatives of [venture]. 
A small number of VCCs recommended the engagement of a merger and acquisition 
advisory, sometimes suggesting which advisory would be a suitable partner for the 
venture.  
From the point of view of the investors involving an M&A advisor preferably in 
the US seems to be sensible to increase the probability of success. 
VCCs rarely established contacts between portfolio firms. In that case, the VCC tried 
to identify synergies between the ventures and looked for potential customers or 
cooperation partners. 
The VCC is looking for another portfolio firm which might be a potential 
customer for the venture. 
Support in human capital issues 
In the coding process, we identified 110 relevant mentions in our sample of value-
adding activities concerning the human capital of VC-backed ventures.  
VCCs pointed out which job positions should be filled and developed job profiles 
together with the portfolio firm. Furthermore, VCCs were sometimes involved in the 
interview process or recommended potential candidates. Recruiting issues were often 
part of milestones. When a milestone was reached, a certain vacancy could be filled. 
Additionally, staffing a position could be a milestone target.  
After filling the sales back-office the target is to find a further sales employee. 
The managing partner has advertised the vacancy. This task is supported by 
[investment manager]. 
Investors and managers agree that after closing the next financing round a full-
time CFO position should be established and filled. 
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Our analysis suggests that among the VCCs in our sample, the use of external or 
internal coaches seems to be an established method for supporting their portfolio 
firms. Some VCCs systematically utilized coaches with special industry or functional 
experience to develop the ventures further. Sometimes these coaches temporarily filled 
critical vacancies in the start-up. VCCs proposed several potential candidates as 
coaches, from which the venture chose. In addition, VCCs intervened if a coach did 
not work out as intended.  
It is planned to establish a coach as well as a supervisory board. 
Currently no coach works together with the start-up. Both investors are 
searching for potential candidates to support in business development, sales 
and investment decisions. 
Some VCCs in our sample advised their portfolio firms to hire consultancies to get 
advice for special projects, such as the development of better organizational processes 
or the creation of a marketing strategy. VCCs often recommended certain 
consultancies with profound expertise for the respective project.  
The development of the organization with lean and fast processes is conducted 
by the [venture] in cooperation with [consultancy]. 
We observed that a few VCCs supported ventures in terms of salaries. For example, 
the VCC might determine changes in salaries and bonuses of the management team or 
recommend the establishment and configuration of employee participation models. In 
addition, we found in some cases that VCC determined cuttings in wages if the venture 
is in an unsecure financial situation.  
For important employees of the venture a virtual employee participation model 
should be established in [year] with approval of all investors. Therefore, 
maximum 5% of the capital stock is available. The allocation is up to 
shareholders and investors. 
Salaries of employees were realigned. Salaries of already existing employees 
are related to prior salaries. However, these employees are willing to give up 
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parts of their salaries (founders -15%, non-founders -10%). These voluntary 
salary cuts were incentivized through exit profit participation. 
Some VCC induced layoffs of employees and in the management team. We observed 
that this was the case due to trimmings of the organization or insufficient suitability 
and incompetency of the respective employee or manager.  
Today we do not have any arguments arguing against the dismissal. Hence, we 
are going to support the layoff of the CEO at the end of [date]. 
Summary of our results 
Analyzing the documents confirms that value adding activities take place in the six 
areas of finance, strategy, governance, operations, networks and human capital. Each 
area consists of a variety of value adding activities. These activities are summarized in 
table 3. 
---Please insert Table 3 about here--- 
Discussion 
The results showed what kind of value-adding activities VCCs in Germany undertake 
to support their ventures during the investment phase. Our investigation disclosed a 
great variety of value-adding activities, some of which support the findings of previous 
studies (e.g., Fried and Hisrich 1995; Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, and Welbourne 1990; 
MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian 1989; Sapienza et al. 1996), but also add to 
literature.  
The degree of support varies greatly across ventures and VCCs. For one investment 
case the VCCs documented 25 value-adding activities, whereas for three ventures no 
value-adding activities at all were mentioned in the document. One reason for no 
mention of activities could be that the founders were so experienced they required no 
value-adding activities. Another reason could be that the investment manager was 
inexperienced and therefore not able to offer activities. A third reason might be that 
value-adding activities occurred, but were not documented.  
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Several explanations, such as different country settings, different strategies of VCCs, 
or VCCs’ experience, account for why some VCCs either are more involved in their 
portfolio firms or report more activities than other VCCs. The legal requirements for 
VC funds and VCCs in Germany differ from those in the US where, for example, 
VCCs are not allowed to be involved operatively with a venture. Furthermore, VCCs 
in the US are more professionalized and are more actively involved in their portfolio 
firms (Sapienza et al. 1996). A further reason for the different levels of VCCs’ 
involvement might be the strategy of the VCCs. Some VCCs perceive themselves as 
strategic partners and company builders for their portfolio firms, whereas other VCCs 
might act solely as financial investors. A third explanation for varying VCC 
involvement stems from VCCs’ business and industry experience: VCs with operating 
experience in the venture's focal industry can add significantly more value than those 
with less industry-specific experience (Sapienza et al. 1996). 
Our analyses indicated that VCCs are highly involved in governance issues in their 
portfolio firms and that governance mechanisms are a widespread form of value-
adding activities. The data collection methods may reflect mainly the perspective of 
VCCs, which require a lot of reporting from their portfolio firms. As our study chiefly 
reflects VCCs’ perspective and not the perspective of the founder, our study might 
overstate the importance of governance mechanisms. However, the relevance of 
governance improvement is also supported by prior published literature showing that 
governance mechanisms – such as active involvement through the board, reporting, 
milestones, and contracting – are commonly applied in VC practice (e.g., Alperovych 
and Hübner 2013; Barney et al. 1989; Brunninge and Nordqvist 2004; Robbie, Wright, 
and Chiplin 1997; Rosenstein 1988; Tang et al. 2014). As VCCs can only roughly 
estimate the founding team´s motivation and performance, governance mechanisms 
can be useful in overcoming the problem of information asymmetries between 
founders and investors. However, since we observed that governance improvements 
are a distributed practice across VCCs, they might not be the value-adding lever for 
standing apart from the competition and developing the venture into a high-flying 
investment.  
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Our analysis shows that, consistent with the findings of Hellmann and Puri (2002), 
VCCs often perform value-adding activities in the area of human capital. The support 
ranges from recruiting, salary and remuneration, and promotion to dismissal issues, as 
was also shown by prior studies (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, and Welbourne 1990; 
MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian 1989; Saetre 2003). Human capital is the one of 
main resources of a new venture. However, VCCs prefer that founding teams are 
complete in terms of experience and competencies in the investment selection process 
– possibly so as to lessen the effort human capital issues require during the investment 
phase.  
Our results show that financial improvements, in addition to governance and human 
capital improvements, belong to the most recorded value-adding activities in the 
documents. This finding is not surprising since financing the venture is one of the core 
activities of VCCs. VCC support in gaining follow-up financing often takes the form 
of bridge financing in the case of liquidity issues, and VCCs also offer support in 
preparing the exit and in financial planning. Prior studies have shown comparable 
results (e.g., Ehrlich et al. 1994; Fried and Hisrich 1995; Gabrielsson and Huse 2002).  
Strategic improvements of the venture were moderately mentioned by VCCs. 
Investment managers often have experience in starting a business or in consulting or 
banking, allowing ventures to benefit from these experiences. This knowledge might 
be especially useful for founders with other backgrounds or experiences, like natural 
science. The study showed that several VCCs provided support in various strategic 
issues, ranging from business, market entry, buy and build, or expansion strategies. 
The majority of prior studies showed in general that VCCs support their ventures 
strategically (e.g., Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel 2004; Knyphausen-Aufseß 2005). 
However, the results of our study offer in-depth information as to the areas of strategy 
and the extent to which VCCs support their ventures in strategic issues.  
The results indicated that support through contacts was documented only moderately 
often, which somehow contradicts former publications since various studies have 
shown that VCCs open their network for their ventures. However, the extent to which 
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VCCs make contacts for their portfolio firms in prior studies is not clear (e.g., Fried 
and Hisrich 1995; Gabrielsson and Huse 2002; Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Saetre 
2003; Sapienza 1992; Timmons and Bygrave 1986). Our results showed that VCCs 
made contact for their ventures with a wide range of people or institutions, including 
potential customers, advisors, and marketing agencies.  
Operational value-adding activities were rarely performed in this sample, which might 
be explained by a variety of reasons. VCCs may not have the capacities to provide 
operational assistance to all ventures since investment managers often supervise five to 
ten investments at the same time. Furthermore, the German legal system prohibits 
asset-managing companies like VCCs from operationally engaging with their ventures. 
As VCCs are only allowed to give advice, their operational involvement in the deal 
documents could violate the law. Nevertheless, operational value-adding activities 
might occur without documentation. Furthermore, European VCCs are less involved in 
their ventures than US or UK VCCs, also in terms of operations (Sapienza et al. 1996). 
VCCs tend to hire coaches or external consultants. 
 Overall, owing to the data collection method operational improvements might be 
underestimated in this study. In contrast to this study´s results, a considerable number 
of other studies showed that VCCs affect operations and the operating performance of 
ventures through various forms of involvement, such as operational planning and 
monitoring, operating activities, or cost and quality control measures (e.g., Ehrlich et 
al. 1994; Fried and Hisrich 1995; Gabrielson and Huse 2002; Gorman and Sahlman 
1989; MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian 1989; Saetre 2003)  .  
Implications and limitations 
Implications 
We have shown that VC can provide a broad portfolio of value-adding activities 
throughout the investment phase. However, what VCCs intend and document 
regarding their involvement in their portfolio firms appears to be rather 
inhomogeneous and only partly structured in terms of documentation. Possibly, 
founders are not aware of which value-adding activities can be provided by the 
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respective VCC. Hence, selecting the most suitable and valuable VCC can be a murky 
and uncertain decision for founders. In addition, VCCs may inform the founder during 
the investment decision-making process what kind of value-adding activities they can 
offer. Nevertheless, as our results indicated that some ventures were not supported 
formally at all, some VCCs may not apply value-adding activities for their ventures.  
For VCCs, a systematic application of value-adding activities might increase the 
chance of successful investments. We observed, for example, that governance 
mechanisms are a common method across VCCs since they are applied in nearly all 
cases in our sample. Other activities are offered irregularly, perhaps depending on a 
venture´s need. A continuous analysis of which value-adding activities are relevant for 
which ventures might be sensible to ensure that all ventures receive the support 
necessary to become a successful investment for the VCC. 
However, a strategic question arises: Should value-adding activities be performed to 
make successful investments more successful or to minimize risk in low-performing 
ventures? Further, some researchers provide evidence that VC investments do not 
outperform the market (e.g., Achleitner et al. 2013; Becsky-Nagy, Balázs, and Fazekas 
2014; Kirkulak 2008). A reason might be the focus on only financial support. 
Limitations 
As content analysis was used as the research method, the study is subject to several 
limitations. In addition, the study has some further limitations owing to the 
peculiarities of the sample.  
First, since content analysis is a purely descriptive research method, the study could 
only assess what was written and intended by the VCCs in the documents. That is, 
only what is described can be analyzed. As a result, informal support in particular is 
not part of the analysis. The findings reflect more the perspective of the VCCs than 
that of the founder, who might have a diverging view on the VCCs’ involvement. 
Furthermore, we cannot check on whether the VCCs kept their promises as to what 
they intended and document regarding their involvement and how this might affect the 
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venture´s performance. However, we believe that most value-added activities are 
documented as this provides evidence of their existence to other stakeholders.  
Second, the content analysis might not be objective since it depends on the writer´s 
point of view as well as the interpretation of the researchers.  
Further, the sample has a focus on technology-based ventures. Hence, whether these 
results can be generalized to other industries is unclear. Technology-based ventures 
may need more support in business issues, as their founders often have a technical 
background instead of a business background.  
In addition, the sample contains only German VCCs and German VC investments. 
Transferring the results to other countries could be problematic, especially in light of 
different legal systems as in the case of operational value-adding activities. A cross-
country comparison might provide further insights into this issue. 
Lastly, the data set consists of a greater share of public than private VCCs, which 
could create a bias as public VCCs might have other investment goals and strategies 
than private VCCs. 
Conclusion 
This study provides content analysis evidence for a wide range of value-adding 
activities among 95 VC-backed investments in Germany. We classified value-adding 
activities into six categories that we identified in a pre-test and created a typology. The 
findings suggest that most VCCs are formally involved in their ventures. However, the 
extent of involvement differs greatly. Our results show that financial, governance, and 
human capital improvements are of highest relevance, which is consistent with prior 
literature. Thereby, VCCs support their ventures in various issues. Operational value-
adding activities play a minor role owing to legal requirements of asset-managing 
companies in Germany.  
Overall, the findings indicate that applying value-adding activities in VC investments 
is common for VCCs in Germany. However, the great variance suggests that there is 
no structured application of value-adding activities. This circumstance opens up 
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several avenues for future research, including analysis of the strategy and motives 
behind value-adding services of VCCs. Our main suggestion is that future research 
pursues the question of whether deviance from intention for VCCs’ involvement is 
prevalent and how this might affect ventures’ performance.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the data set. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev 
Age of portfolio companies (years) 4.59 2.09 
Size of founders’ team (founders) 2.85 1.13 
Number of founding rounds (rounds) 1.98 0.89 
Investment sum seed (Euros) 784,487 519,577 
Investment sum Series A (Euros) 1,202,948 1,179,085 
Number of investors seed  2.55 1.98 
Number of investors Series A  3.94 2.54 
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Table 2. Mentions of different types of value-adding in venture capital 
documents. 
Type of value 
adding 
Business 
plan 
Due 
diligence 
Decision 
paper 
Venture 
reporting 
VC 
reporting 
Board 
meeting 
minutes 
Total 
Human capital 0 0 59 27 4 20 110 
Network 0 0 15 16 0 8 39 
Strategy 0 0 15 15 6 11 47 
Strategy 
(board) 
2 0 24 32 7 65 130 
Governance 0 0 44 52 3 25 124 
Financial 1 0 40 34 3 30 108 
Operational 0 0 5 3 1 2 11 
Others 0 0 6 10 0 2 18 
Total 3 0 208 189 24 163 587 
Percentage 0.51% 0.00% 35.43% 32.20% 4.09% 27.77% 100.00% 
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Table 3. Summary of the different value-adding activities reported in the VC 
documents. 
Value adding lever Identified sub categories 
Financial 
improvements 
Follow-up financing, bridge financing, preparation of exit, financial 
planning 
Strategic 
improvements 
Business strategy, sales strategy, buy and build strategy, market entry 
strategy, engagement of consultancies, strategic partners, business plan 
Governance 
improvements 
Contracting, milestones, reporting 
Operational 
improvements 
Operational recommendations (e.g., process or organizational 
optimization, support in cost-cutting, support in marketing, support in 
legal issues) 
Support through 
networks 
New investors (e.g., other VCC, business angels or strategic investors), 
potential customers, sales partners, M&A advisors, portfolio firms of the 
VCC, appraisers, marketing agencies, recruiting firms 
Support in human 
capital issues 
Recruiting, coaching, consulting, salaries and remuneration, layoffs, 
replacement of CEO, promotions 
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Abstract  
Established literature has shown that venture capital funds’ high returns can be partly 
attributed to value adding activities performed by the venture capital firms in their 
portfolio firms. Despite of the topic´s importance, to date there is no structured 
literature review providing possibilities for improvements concerning data and 
methods. This paper provides a literature analysis on value adding activity measures in 
venture capital investments, synthesizes the variables measuring the main levers of 
value adding and identifies directions for improvement in terms of data, variables and 
methods. Hence, I studied 37 articles regarding the type of data collection method, 
methodology, sample region and variables. The analyses showed that data are 
primarily gathered through databases or surveys which are subject to several 
limitations. To measure value adding activities great inconsistencies exist regarding 
the variables used. Therefore, to assure a better comparability of studies in this 
research stream, this paper calls for other data collection methods and the development 
of established variables and scales. 
Keywords 
New venture, venture growth, venture capital, value adding, value creation 
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Introduction 
During the last three decades there is a growing interest in academia in the topic of 
value adding activities applied by VC (venture capital) firms to their portfolio 
companies to increase the chance of successfully exiting the investment. A number of 
studies showed that VC-backed firms achieve higher returns than non VC-backed 
firms (Barry and Mihov, 2013; Bessler & Seim, 2012; Chiampou & Kallett, 1989; 
Dagogo & Ollor, 2009; Guo & Jiang, 2013; Robinson, 1987). Empirical work has been 
done to investigate how VC firms add value to their portfolio companies in the last 
thirty years (see Figure 1). Considering prior studies it can be observed that venture 
capital firms add value to their portfolio firms through financial, strategic, governance, 
operational, human capital and network improvements (Achleitner et al., 2013; 
Agarwal and Chatterjee, 2007; Cumming et al., 2005; Macmillan et al., 1989). For 
example, governance improvements can be achieved due to milestones, reporting 
mechanisms and employee involvement (Barnes, 2004; Schertler, 2003).  
This previous work offers valuable insights into the critical role of venture capital 
firms for their portfolio companies. However, these studies also highlight the need for 
further thorough and comprehensive analyses of value adding activities. In spite of the 
rising attention for this research topic, there remains a lack of systematic approaches 
measuring and analyzing value adding activities to assure a comparability of studies. 
Hence, the aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature regarding 
various types of value adding activities. To this end 37 studies were reviewed. 
Information on data collection method, research method, sample size and region as 
well as variables measuring value adding activities were synthesized. Based on this, 
gaps, deficiencies and ideas for improvements in terms of data, variables and methods 
were identified for this research field. 
In venture capital literature, terms such as “value adding measures”, “value adding 
activities” and “value creation measures” are often used interchangeably. Equally, 
“value adding” and “value creation” are used synonymously. To assure clarity in terms 
of terminology this study uses the following synonyms: value adding and value adding 
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activities. The paper follows the following structure. The next section introduces the 
methodology used to pursue the literature review. This is followed by an analysis of 
various studies related to value adding activities based on data, variables and methods. 
Afterwards, gaps, deficiencies and ideas for improvements in the reviewed literature 
are highlighted. Finally, the paper closes with a conclusion.  
Method 
To receive the relevant literature on value adding activities in the venture capital 
industry I used the following strategy. First, I searched in the EBSCOhost (Business 
Source Complete) and ScienceDirect for combinations of keywords such as “venture 
capital”, “value”, “value creation” or “value adding” and “return” in the title and 
abstract of articles. In this course in total 124 articles were identified. Thereby, I only 
included publications like academic journal articles and conference papers based on 
any type of empirical analysis. Some of the studies were existent in more than one 
database. Hence, this amount of studies should not be taken as mutually exclusive. I 
studied the abstracts, data and results section of each article. Those articles not in the 
research stream of value adding activities in the venture capital industry were 
eliminated. Most of the excluded studies dealt with the question whether venture 
capital firms create value at all, but not how. Furthermore, I eliminated all articles 
which were not based on empirical research since the present study analyzes data, 
variables and methods of studies. In 37 out of 124 articles value adding activities in the 
venture capital industry were the dominant addressed topic (see Figure 1).  
(Figure 1 near here) 
This searching strategy of identifying relevant literature is subject to a limitation since 
important works that have not used the selected key words but analyzed a comparable 
subject might be neglected. To reduce this problem, I searched for further articles in 
the references of the selected articles. Nevertheless, this review may not have 
identified every study published in this field of research. Due to this systematic 
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approach I believe that the overview is comprehensive enough to provide a broad 
overview of research in this subject. 
Literature on value adding measures by venture capital firms 
The literature stream of value adding activities of venture capital firms started to grow 
in the 1980s. Considering our selected articles this review shows that the number of 
studies increased over the last three decades. The rise of studies especially in the 2000s 
reflects the growing importance of value adding activities of venture capital firms. 
Especially in times of money as a commodity (Rosenstein et al., 1993) value adding 
activities become even more important to attract the most promising ventures and 
higher the chance of a successful exit of the investment. Research in this field mainly 
focuses on different types of value creation measures and their impact on different 
success indicators of the venture, i.e. performance (Sapienza, 1992), sales growth 
(Macmillan et al, 1989), returns (Cumming et al., 2005; Macmillan et al, 1989), exit 
success (Bellavitis et al., 2014; Bottazzi and Da Rin., 2002; Busenitz et al., 2004; 
Checkley et al., 2010; Cumming et al., 2005; Hochberg et al., 2007; Siepel, 2016), 
initial public offering (Chang, 2004; Checkley et al., 2010; Cumming, 2005) and 
internal rate of return (Cumming et al., 2005; Manigart et al., 2002).   
Samples, data collection and data analysis methods of previous studies 
The selected studies were analyzed under various viewpoints considering data, 
variables and methods (see table 1): Sample size, observed object, data collection 
method, data analysis method and region. The samples range in terms of size heavily 
depending on the type of data collection method and data analysis method. As it can be 
expected samples collected from databases have rather large sample sizes, surveys and 
interviews middle size samples and case studies small samples. Furthermore, it is not 
observable that sample sizes grew over time. A great diversity exists in terms of which 
person or object was analyzed in the samples. First, a distinction can be made between 
different types of people like entrepreneurs (e.g. see Ehrlich et al., 1994), CEOs of 
VC-backed firms (e.g. see Sapienza, 1992) and venture managers or partners (e.g. see 
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Robbie et al., 1997) and secondly between institutions like VC-backed firms (e.g. see 
Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Barney et al., 1989), VC firms (e.g. see MacMillan et 
al., 1989; Gorman and Sahlmann, 1989), VC funds (e.g. see Sweeting, 1997), 
corporate VC firms (e.g. see Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2005) as well as VC deals or 
transactions (Bellavitis et al., 2014; Cumming, 2005). When it comes to data collection 
method this review shows that mainly databases, surveys and interviews were used to 
gather relevant data. However, only one study is based on the original deal documents 
(Steier and Greenwood, 1995). Over time a tendency towards multiple data collection 
approaches becomes apparent and the usage of databases increases. In more than 50% 
of the studies data was analyzed mainly from the United States and/or overall North 
America. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s studies were foremost conducted in the 
United States which can be explained by the fact that the VC market in the United 
States as well as research is further developed in the United States compared to other 
regions. There are some studies from Europe (e.g. Lehmann, 2006), from Asia (e.g. 
Pruthi et. al., 2003), from Australia (Cumming et al., 2005) and Africa (Dagogo and 
Ollor, 2009). Only 16% of researchers collected their samples in different countries. 
Furthermore, the comparison of similarities and differences across countries is even 
less researched (e.g. Sapienza et al., 1996). The types of sampling and data collection 
method have implications for the research method as well as the interpretation of the 
results since the applied techniques are diverse and subject to several limitations.  
(Insert table 1 near here) 
Research methods used in previous studies 
In the reviewed studies mainly three types of research methods were applied, namely 
empirical studies, qualitative analyses and case study approaches. In order to test the 
impact of various value adding activities on different success measures, studies used 
different statistical analysis techniques, such as correlations, multivariate regression, 
Granger causality, network analysis, negative binomial estimation, hazard model etc. 
In studies with an explorative nature data was foremost collected by semi-structured 
interviews (e.g. Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2005; Saetre, 2003; 
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Steier and Greenwood, 1995). A moderate amount of studies used secondary or third 
resources, e.g. company data or surveys, to combine different analysis methods (e.g. 
Bellavitis et al., 2014; Fujiwara and Kimura, 2012). In the reviewed studies the 
majority of respondents or interview partners were chief executive officer, 
entrepreneurs or venture managers. Some studies utilized also mixed respondents, i.e. 
VC-backed and non VC-backed firms (Dagogo and Ollor, 2009) or managers of 
ventures and VC firms (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002; Rosenstein et al., 1993; Sapienza 
et al., 1996). The approach of mixed respondents is firstly useful to lessen the 
problems of common method bias and secondly provides results from different 
perspectives of different stakeholders. As shown in table 1, statistical methods used to 
test the impact of value adding activities on success of VC-backed investments 
developed over time. Early studies foremost used descriptive statistics, multiple 
regression or qualitative methods. In more recent studies techniques like Granger 
causality, Cox and Heckman regressions or cross-sectional econometrics were applied. 
Studies of explorative nature included also tables, figures, and matrices to illustrate 
results. 
Measuring value adding activities in previous studies 
The second aim of the review is the analysis of variables used in the selected studies to 
measure value adding activities. Thereby, it was also targeted to compare how 
different studies measure the same or comparable variables, e.g. the variable advisory 
board was measured in six different ways (see table 3). The majority of studies used 
the number of seats on board like Campbell and Frye (2009), Gabrielsson and Huse 
(2002), Gorman and Sahlmann (1989), Rosenstein et al. (1993) and Sapienza et al. 
(1996). Fujiwara and Kimura (2012) measured this variable on a 4 point scale, 
whereas Fried et al. (1998) used a 7 point scale. Furthermore, Bottazii et al. (2008) and 
Robbie et al. (1997) controlled if the VC firm has at least a seat on board and Barney 
et al. (1989) measured the percentage of seats the VC firm has on the venture board.  
For all types of value adding activities which were identified in the literature, i.e. 
financial, governance, strategic, operational, network and human capital 
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improvements, various variables were used to measure their impact on venture´s 
success. Variables measuring governance value adding activities were found in the 
majority of the selected studies (see table 3). Furthermore, to measure governance 
value adding activities the highest numbers of variables was used (compared to the 
other five types of value adding activities). This might reflect the importance of 
governance improvements in VC-backed firms since VC firms are active investors and 
use several governance mechanisms to control and monitor the venture firm. In terms 
of the number of studies analyzing different types of improvements it is also apparent 
that also financial and network value adding activities are of high relevance (see tables 
2 and 6). To the contrary, strategic, operational and human capital value adding 
activities are relatively moderately researched (see tables 4, 5 and 7). Nevertheless, 
studies proved that strategic, operational and human capital value adding activities 
impact the success of VC-backed investments (Guo and Jiang, 2013; Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza et al., 1996). 
Analyzing how the great variety of variables was measured it is obvious that there are 
some variables, e.g. follow-up financing, advisory boards, monitoring or development 
of business strategy, which were used very often in studies. Nevertheless, there is also 
a considerable amount of variables which I found only once in the selected studies, 
e.g. organizational development, contacts for follow up financing and exit or 
development of competencies of management team. Furthermore, when it comes to the 
point how variables are measured great inconsistencies are apparent as well. This can 
be explained by the variety of data collection methods used in studies. Secondly, 
several studies have an explorative character in which no established scales existed 
since this research stream is rather young.  
(Insert table 2-8 here) 
Gaps and deficiencies in literature 
The literature analysis showed that the research stream on value adding activities in 
VC investments received a growing attention over the past 30 years. For the review I 
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studied qualitative as well as quantitative studies including surveys, interviews and 
case studies. The majority of studies is of quantitative nature. Based on this review I 
suggest six directions to improve the literature stream on VC value adding:  
 Use original deal documents rather than surveys or databases 
Value adding activities are among the most sensitive tasks for many VC firms. Hence, 
collecting data is consistently difficult. Furthermore, young, entrepreneurial ventures 
are not subject to publication duties of company data like large corporations. To 
represent the population adequately researchers have to collect data from as many 
observations as possible. However, the number of companies willing to take part in 
these studies is very limited. Therefore, researchers often rely on surveys or databases 
to collect data. Using surveys or databases data is subject to several limitations. The 
response rate of surveys is often relatively low which limits the meaningfulness of the 
study since it presents only a low percentage of the whole population. Furthermore, 
survey responses also underlie biases, e.g. socially desirable answers or the 
subjectivity of scales, especially when these are not standardized. Considering 
databases, the deepness and wideness of these data is rather limited since they are 
often based on publicly available data. Therefore, it is difficult to gather data on 
internal practices of VC firms. As recommendation for further research, it would be 
meaningful if future studies base their data analysis on real deal documents, e.g. 
decision templates, reporting and investment committee papers of VC firms. However, 
it is known that it is of great difficulty to get access to this kind of data.  
 Include perspectives from multiple stakeholders in the analysis 
In the selected studies researchers preferentially relied on single respondents. Thereby, 
foremost VC firms or the entrepreneur/ manager of the venture have been taken into 
account in the analysis. Only very few studies like Gabrielsson and Huse (2002) 
analyzed both perspectives which is useful to enrich the quality of the results. Studying 
different stakeholders would offer different perceptions. Furthermore, this has the 
advantage of validating the results.   
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 Improve consistency in variables used to measure a certain value adding 
activity type 
Established literature has shown that six different types or groups of value adding 
activities were studied in literature before, i.e. financial, strategic, governance, 
operational, human capital and network improvements. Additionally, for each of the 
value adding activity types various measures can be pursued by VC firms to improve 
the venture. For example to advance a venture from a financial perspective, 
researchers analyzed the measures support in follow up financing/ fundraising, 
receiving financial expertise, convertibles, preferred stocks, give a sense of economic 
safety, debt and syndication. In the selected studies foremost two to three variables 
were used to investigate financial improvements. Hence, a great diversity exists among 
studies how a certain value adding activity type was analyzed. Therefore it is again 
complicated to compare the results of different studies. However, it offers more in-
depth implications for practitioners which measure or sets of value adding activities 
measures can be useful. 
 Develop and use established scales to measure similar variables 
The need for developing established scales of certain variables is one of the core 
suggestions of this paper since I observed that the way how variables are measured is 
highly inconsistent across studies. Established scales have the advantages of easy 
understanding, but also of reliability and validity. Furthermore, they assure that is 
measured what is intended. Some studies try to use comparable measures or prior 
published studies to overcome the problem of non-comparability. Nevertheless, the 
variations are high for nearly all variables.  
 Improve consistency in usage of dependent variable 
Considering the dependent variable “value added”, in the selected studies it can be 
observed that also in this respect a great variety exists among studies (see table 8). 
This might be partially explained by the fact that value added or success is difficult to 
measure. Measuring the success of new ventures is not trivial due to the lack of 
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historical data and the accessibility of data (Brush and Vanderwerf 1992; Gartner and 
Shane 1995). This problem might be reduced by using sets of different success 
indicators and multiple sources according to Brush and Vanderwerf (1992) and 
Murphy et al. (1996). Studies like Cumming et al. (2005) and Hochberg et al., (2007) 
used at least three different success measures. Nevertheless, which value added 
measure was used and how it was measured varied a lot, e.g. returns was measured in 
dollar value (Cumming et al., 2005) and at a five point scale (Macmillan et al, 1989). 
Moreover, exit success was measured as value 1 if the venture was acquired or 
merged, or listed in an initial public offering (Bellavitis et al., 2014), as value 1 if the 
venture was acquired or listed in an initial public offering and 0 if otherwise (Bottazzi 
and Da Rin, 2002), as exit rate (Busenitz et al., 2004), as number of successful exits 
(Checkley et al., 2010) and as proportion of investments exited (Cumming et al., 
2005). Due to this great variety of value added measures it is again difficult to 
compare the results of the different studies. On the other hand, the use of different 
target variables shows that different value adding activity measures influence certain 
success measures differently. This offers greater implications for practitioners which 
value adding activity is more effective for certain goals.  
 Increase number of international or comparative studies 
The majority of studies were conducted based on a sample analyzing VC firms or VC-
backed ventures from the United States. During the 1990s the first studies were 
published analyzing different regions or countries regarding value adding activities of 
VC firms. Nevertheless, the number of studies from other countries is currently rather 
moderate. Furthermore, only very few studies undertook comparative studies like 
Sapienza et al. (1996) and Manigart et al. (2002). Therefore, a lack of research is 
existent analyzing commonalities as well as differences in value adding activities 
across countries which can be expected due to cultural differences.  
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Conclusion and future research 
During the last thirty years a growing and noteworthy amount of research offering 
useful findings for practitioners and researchers was published in the research stream 
of value adding activities of VC firms. The most often discussed topics were the two 
questions if and how VC firms affect VC-backed venture´s performance. Researchers 
have shown that VC firms apply diverse sets of tools to increase the likelihood of 
investment´s success.  
The growing number of studies in this area encouraged this review. I hope that this 
review is informative and somewhat provoking and that it shows researchers how data, 
variables and methods can be improved. Both qualitative and quantitative studies 
showed rich evidence on the critical role of value adding activities by VC firms. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of gaps and deficiencies in this research topic 
highlighting the need for better data quality and variables. Considering these gaps and 
deficiencies, I identified some important considerations for future research. Firstly, 
original deal documents would higher the quality of data immensely since most of the 
studies use surveys or databases as data collection method. Secondly, to validate the 
findings and extend the perspective on value adding activities of VC firms, future 
studies considering both the perspective of the VC firm and the VC-backed venture 
would enrich this literature stream. Lastly, there is a great variety regarding which 
variables are analyzed in studies and how they are measured. This holds true for 
dependent as well as independent variables. Therefore, the development and use of 
established scales as in other literature streams like psychology or marketing would 
improve the comparability of studies.  
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Table 2 Overview of selected studies for review with respect to data, data collection and data analysis method (n=37) 
Authors Sample/ respondents Data collection method Data analysis method Region 
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) n= 1,501 VC-backed firms Venture Economics database, 
interviews 
Descriptive statistics, cluster 
analysis 
North America 
MacMillan et al. (1989) n= 62 VC firms Survey Descriptive statistics, cluster 
analysis, regression analysis 
North America 
Gorman and Sahlmann (1989) n= 49 VC firms Survey Descriptive statistics North America 
Barney et al. (1989) n= 54 VC-backed firms Interviews, American 
Electronics Association 
membership directory and 
announcements in the venture 
capital journal 
OLS regression North America 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (1990) n= 20 VC firms and CEOs of 
VC-backed ventures 
Interviews and participant-
observation methods  
Qualitative analysis North America 
Sapienza (1992) n= 51 CEOs of VC-backed 
firms and lead VC investor 
Survey Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, regression analysis 
North America 
Rosenstein et al. (1993) n= 198 CEOs of VC-backed 
firms in survey, n= 98 CEOs of 
VC-backed firms in telephone 
interview 
Survey, telephone interviews Descriptive statistics North America 
Ehrlich et al. (1994) n= 47 Entrepreneurs Survey Descriptive statistics, ANOVA, 
cross tabulations 
North America 
Elango et al. (1995) n= 149 VC firms E-Mail survey Descriptive statistics North America 
2 
 
 
Fried and Hisrich (1995) n= 14 VC-financed firms Interviews Qualitative analysis North America 
Steier and Greenwood (1995) n= 1 VC-backed firm Interviews, site visits and 
archival material 
Case study analysis North America 
Sapienza et al. (1996) n= 51 VC firms and CEO of 
venture 
Survey Descriptive statistics, regression 
analysis  
North America and Europe 
Murray (1996) n= 6 VC-backed firms Survey Case study analysis Europe 
Sweeting (1997) n= 3 VC funds Interviews and published 
statistics 
Descriptive statistics, qualitative 
analysis 
UK 
Fried et al. (1998) n= 68 VC firms E-Mail survey Descriptive statistics North America 
Robbie et al. (1997) n= 25 individuals from VC 
firms, n= 108 VC firms 
Interviews based on structured 
questionnaire, mailed survey 
Descriptive statistics  UK 
Flynn and Forman (2001) n= 87 VC firms Survey Descriptive statistics, 
correlations 
Worldwide 
Manigart et al. (2002) n= 209 VC firms Survey Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, LDV regression 
North America and Europe 
Brandner et al. (2002) n= 284 VC-backed exits Dataset collected by Macdonald 
& Associates  
Descriptive statistics, regression 
analysis 
North America 
Gabrielsson and Huse (2002) n= 135 small technology based 
entrepreneurial firms, n= 65 
CEOs of VC firms 
Multiple data collection 
approach 
Descriptive analysis, 
correlations, regression analysis 
Sweden 
Pruthi et. al. (2003) n= 37 venture capitalists Survey, interviews Descriptives statistics, ANOVA, 
correlations, regression  
Asia 
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Saetre (2003) n= 4 VC-backed firms Interviews Multiple case study analysis Norway 
Chang (2004) n= 1,106 VC-backed firms Venture Economics database 
and Joint Venture/ Strategic 
Alliance Database of the SDC 
Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, hazard model  
Worldwide 
Busenitz et al. (2004) n= 183 VC-backed firms E-Mail survey Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, bivariate analysis, 
Cox regression 
North America 
Cumming et al. (2005) n= 806 VC-backed 
entrepreneurial firms 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Venture Capital Survey  
Descriptive statistics, cross-
sectional econometrics 
Australia 
Cumming (2005) n= 3083 transactions Dataset collected by Macdonald 
& Associates  
Descriptive statistics, Panel 
data, correlations, logit 
regression 
North America 
Knyphausen-Aufseß (2005) n= 4 Corporate venture 
capitalists 
Website information, press 
releases, company presentations 
and ten personal 
interviews with executives and 
investment managers of the 
companies 
Multiple case study analysis Worldwide 
Maula et al. (2005) n= 91 CEOs and founders of 
CVC financed firms 
Survey Descriptive statistics, univariate 
tests, regression analysis, 
ANOVA 
North America 
Lehmann (2006) n= 108 VC-backed firms Hand collected data set from 
German Neuer Markt, German 
Patent Office, Deutsche Börse 
AG, Datastream, OnVista 
Descriptive statistics, OLS 
estimation, probit and negative 
binomial estimation 
Germany 
Hochberg et al. (2007) n= 3,469 VC funds  Thomson Financial´s Venture 
Economics Database 
Descriptive statistics, network 
analysis, regression analysis 
North America 
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De Clercq and Dimov (2008) n= 200 VC firms, n= 8,162 
initial investments 
Thomson Financial´s 
VentureXpert database 
Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, logit regression 
North America 
Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) n= 119 venture firms, n=503 
venture partners, n=1,652 
portfolio companies 
Survey, Amadeus, Worldscope, 
Venture Expert, national 
venture capital associations, 
Thomson Financial, SDC 
Descriptive statistics, univariate 
tests, probit regression 
Europe 
Campbell and Frye (2009) n= 444 ventures Initial public offering 
prospectus database developed 
by R. R. Donnelley Financial 
and initial public offering 
Crossroads 
Descriptive statistics, 
instrumental variables 
regression, Heckman regression 
North America 
Dagogo and Ollor (2009) n= 120 (VC-backed and non 
VC-backed firms) 
Selection under SMEEIS Descriptive statistics, multiple 
regression analysis 
Nigeria 
Checkley et al. (2010) n= 39 VC firms, observed over 
11 years 
Hand collected data set from a 
commercial database developed 
by IE Consulting and 
supplementary data from British 
Venture Capital Association´s 
Directory of Members and VC 
firm´s websites 
Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, Granger causality 
UK 
Fujiwara and Kimura (2012) n= 32 VC firms Combination of primary data 
collected in an internet-based 
survey and secondary data from 
public databases, i.e. Dow Jones 
Galante´s Venture Capital & 
Private Equity Directory 
Descriptive statistics, OLS 
regression, correlations, probit 
regression 
North America 
Bellavitis et al. (2014) n= 1,264 VC-backed companies 
with n=5,344 VC deals 
Qualitative interviews, 
Thomson One Banker database 
Descriptive statistics, 
correlations, random-effect 
panel logistic regression 
North America 
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Table 3 Overview of variables and measurements of financial value adding activities    
  
Follow up 
financing/ 
fundraising 
Receiving 
financial expertise 
Convertible Preferred stocks  
Give sense of 
economic safety 
Debt 
Strategic 
alliances/ 
syndication 
Gorman and 
Sahlmann (1989) 
Ranking             
Cumming et al., 
(2005) 
  
Proportion of 
investments 
receiving financial 
expertise 
          
Chang (2004)             
Counts of articles 
written 
Hochberg,  et al., 
(2007) 
            Binary 
Cumming (2005)     Proportion Proportion   Proportion   
MacMillan et al., 
(1989) 
4 point scale         4 point scale   
Rosenstein et al., 
(1993) 
Rating of top five         Rating of top three   
Elango et al., (1995) 5 point scale              
Brandner et al., 
(2002) 
            
If syndication 
occurs = 1, not= 0 
De Clercq and 
Dimov (2008) 
            
Number of 
syndication 
partners 
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Checkley et al., 
(2010) 
            Not available 
Fujiwara and Kimura 
(2012) 
            7 point likert scale 
Lehmann (2006)             
Number of VC 
firms provided 
equity to investors 
Pruthi et al., (2003) 5 point likert scale             
Bottazzi and Da Rin, 
(2002) 
value 1 if VC firm 
helped to obtain 
additional 
financing, 0 
otherwise 
          
value 1 indicates if 
company is 
financed by single 
investor, 0 
otherwise 
Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(1990) 
Mentioned in 
interviews 
Mentioned in 
interviews 
          
Ehrlich et al. (1994) Ranking             
Fried and Hisrich 
(1995) 
Mentioned in 
interviews 
            
Gabrielsson and 
Huse (2002) 
Five point scale Five point scale     Five point scale   
Participation in 
syndicates 
Maula et al. (2005) 
Multi item scale 
measuring 
satisfaction 
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Table 3 Overview of variables and measurements of governance value adding activities 
  
Advisory 
board 
Inde-
pendent 
directors 
at board 
Contracts 
Monito-
ring  
Milestones Reporting 
Personal 
exchange/ 
interaction 
Resolve 
compen-
sation 
issues 
Preferred 
Stock 
Dilution 
Equity 
based 
compen-
sation 
Help form 
and 
manage 
board 
Sapienza 
(1992) 
            
Frequency 
of interact-
tion per 
week 
          
Gorman 
and 
Sahlmann 
(1989) 
Number of 
seats in 
board 
          
% of total 
working 
hour 
spending 
with 
monitoring 
and 
assisting 
portfolio 
companies 
Ranking 
and 
frequency 
      
Ranking 
and 
frequency 
Cumming 
et al., 
(2005) 
            
Average 
days per 
month with 
investee 
company 
          
Sapienza et 
al. (1996) 
Number of 
directors 
serving on 
board 
Number of 
independen
t directors 
and VC 
firm 
members in 
board 
        
7 point 
scale 
(frequency 
of face to 
face 
interaction) 
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Fujiwara 
and Kimura 
(2012) 
4 point 
scale 
              
4 point 
scale 
4 point 
scale 
    
Manigart et 
al., (2002) 
      
Percentage 
of lead 
investments
/ number of 
investments 
per VC 
firm 
                
MacMillan 
et al., 
(1989) 
      
4 point 
scale 
                
Fried et al. 
(1998) 
7 point 
scale 
                      
Rosenstein 
et al. (1993) 
Number of 
directors 
serving on 
board 
    
Rating of 
top three 
                
Elango et 
al. (1995) 
              
5 point 
scale  
      
5 point 
scale 
Robbie et 
al., (1997) 
Has seat on 
board 
    
4 point 
scale/ 
Amount of 
monitoring 
information 
and actions 
required 
Number of 
performanc
e targets 
Increased 
amount 
and/or 
frequency 
of reporting 
More 
frequent 
presentatio
n/ visit 
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Campbell 
and Frye 
(2009) 
Number of 
directors 
serving on 
board 
Number of 
independen
t directors 
and VC 
firm 
members in 
board 
                
Percentage 
of manage-
ment 
compen-
sation that 
is equity 
based 
  
Dagogo and 
Ollor 
(2009) 
      n/a                 
Pruthi et 
al., (2003) 
    
5 point 
scale 
5 point  
scale 
  
5 point  
scale 
  
5 point 
scale 
        
Barney et 
al., (1989) 
% of seats 
in board of 
VC firm 
                      
Bottazzi 
and Da Rin, 
(2002) 
value 1 
indicates of 
VC firms is 
a board 
member 
  
value 1 
indicates if 
instruments 
like straight 
debt, 
preferred 
equity or 
convertible 
debt are 
used 
      
value 1 if 
monthly or 
weekly 
contact 
between 
VC firm 
and venture 
          
Gomez-
Mejia et al. 
(1990) 
          
Mentioned 
in 
interviews 
  
Mentioned 
in 
interviews 
        
Ehrlich et 
al. (1994) 
      Ranking     
Five point 
scale 
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Fried and 
Hisrich 
(1995) 
            
Mentioned 
in 
interviews 
          
 
Gabrielsson 
and Huse 
(2002) 
Number of 
directors 
serving on 
board 
Number of 
outside 
directors 
  
Nine point 
scale 
    
Total 
amount of 
time spend 
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Table 4 Overview of variables and measurements of strategic value adding activities 
 
Development of 
business strategy 
Review business plan Analysis if competitors Strategic support IM Evaluate acquisitions Sounding board 
Gorman and 
Sahlmann (1989) 
      Ranking and frequency     
Cumming et al., 
(2005) 
      
Proportion of 
investments receiving 
strategic/ management 
support 
    
Sapienza et al., 
(1996) 
      
Ratings of importance 
and effectiveness 
  
Ratings of importance 
and effectiveness 
MacMillan et al. 
(1989) 
4 point scale         4 point scale 
Fried et al. (1998) 7 point scale           
Rosenstein et al., 
(1993) 
Rating of top three           
Dagogo and Ollor 
(2009) 
not available     not available     
Pruthi et al. (2003) 5 point scale     5 point scale 5 point scale 5 point scale 
Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(1990) 
Mentioned in interviews Mentioned in interviews         
Ehrlich et al. (1994) Ranking         Ranking 
Fried and Hisrich 
(1995) 
          Mentioned in interviews 
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Gabrielsson and 
Huse (2002) 
Five point of scale         Five point scale 
Maula et al. (2005)     
Multi item scale 
measuring satisfaction 
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Table 5 Overview of variables and measurements of operational value adding activities 
  
Development of 
technology 
Organizational 
development 
Operational 
planning 
Assist with 
marketing and sales 
Engineering, 
production, 
operations 
Receiving 
marketing expertise 
Receiving 
administrative 
expertise 
Gorman and 
Sahlmann (1989) 
    
Ranking and 
frequency 
        
Cumming et al., 
(2005) 
          
Proportion of 
investments 
receiving marketing 
support 
Proportion of 
investments 
receiving 
administration 
support 
MacMillan et al. 
(1989) 
4 point scale         4 point scale   
Elango et al., (1995)     5 point scale          
Dagogo and Ollor 
(2009) 
        n/a     
Pruthi et al., (2003)     5 point scale 5 point scale       
Ehrlich et al. (1994) Ranking     Ranking       
Gabrielsson and 
Huse (2002) 
Five point of scale       Five point of scale Five point of scale   
Maula et al. (2005) 
Multi item scale 
measuring 
satisfaction 
Multi item scale 
measuring 
satisfaction 
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Table 6 Overview of variables and measurements of network value adding activities 
  
Contacts to 
customers and 
suppliers 
Use of 
network 
contacts 
Contact for 
follow up 
financing and 
exit 
Professional 
contacts 
Making 
external 
contacts 
easier 
Introduction to 
potential service 
providers 
Intra-
industry 
network 
Extra-
industry 
network 
Network 
Business 
linkages 
and 
networks 
Gorman and 
Sahlmann 
(1989) 
Ranking and 
frequency 
                  
Sapienza et al. 
(1996) 
Ratings of 
importance and 
effectiveness 
  
Ratings of 
importance and 
effectiveness 
Ratings of 
importance and 
effectiveness 
            
Hochberg,  et 
al., (2007) 
                Binary   
MacMillan et 
al., (1989) 
4 point scale                   
Rosenstein et 
al., (1993) 
5 point scale          5 point scale          
Elango et al., 
(1995) 
5 point scale                    
Dagogo and 
Ollor (2009) 
                  n/a 
Pruthi et al., 
(2003) 
5 point scale         5 point scale         
Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (1990) 
Mentioned in 
interviews 
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Ehrlich et al. 
(1994) 
Ranking                   
Fried and 
Hisrich (1995) 
  
Mentioned in 
interviews 
                
Gabrielsson 
and Huse 
(2002) 
  
Five point of 
scale 
    
Five point 
of scale 
          
Maula et al. 
(2005) 
Multi item scale 
measuring 
satisfaction 
                  
Bellavitis et 
al., (2014) 
            
Self-
developed 
matrix 
Self-
developed 
matrix 
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Table 7 Overview of variables and measurements of human capital value adding activities 
  
Contacts to 
consultants and 
new personal 
Coach/ Mentor 
Development of 
competencies of 
management team  
Recruiting 
Hiring outside 
investors 
Manage crises and 
problems 
Motivation 
Gorman and 
Sahlmann (1989) 
Ranking and 
frequency 
            
Sapienza et al., 
(1996) 
  
Ratings of 
importance and 
effectiveness 
  
Ratings of 
importance and 
effectiveness 
      
MacMillan et al., 
(1989) 
4 point scale     4 point scale   4 point scale 4 point scale 
Rosenstein et al., 
(1993) 
Rating of top three     Rating of top three   Rating of top three   
Elango et al., (1995) 5 point scale      5 point scale        
Pruthi et al., (2003) 5 point scale         5 point scale 5 point scale 
Bottazzi and Da Rin, 
(2002) 
 
    
value 1 if VC firm 
recruited for venture, 
0 otherwise 
value 1 if VC firm 
involved in hiring 
outside director, 0 
otherwise 
    
Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(1990) 
  
Mentioned in 
interviews 
  
Mentioned in 
interviews 
      
Ehrlich et al. (1994)     Ranking Ranking   Ranking Ranking 
Gabrielsson and 
Huse (2002) 
  Five point of scale   Five point of scale       
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Maula et al. (2005)       
Multi item scale 
measuring 
satisfaction 
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Table 8 Overview of dependent variables 
 Sales growth Employment 
growth 
Performance  Returns Market share Exit success ROA IPO IRR 
MacMillan et al. 
(1989) 
Five point scale     Five point scale Five point scale         
Barney et al. 
(1989) 
      $ value           
Sapienza (1992)     Multi-criterion 
measure 
            
Bottazzi and Da 
Rin (2002) 
            In Percent If IPO took 
place 
  
Manigart et al. 
(2002) 
                Seven category 
criterion in % 
Brandner et al. 
(2002) 
  Measured by 
the number of 
employees  
              
Chang (2004)               IPO success 
rates 
  
Busenitz et al. 
(2004) 
          Exit rate       
Cumming et al. 
(2005) 
          Proportion of 
investment 
exited 
    $ value 
Hochberg et al. 
(2007) 
          Exit rate, $ exit 
rate 
  IPO rate, $ IPO 
rate 
  
Checkley et al.           Number of       
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(2010) successful exits 
Bellavitis et al. 
(2014) 
          1 if venture was 
acquired, 
merged or IPO; 
0 if otherwise 
      
Paglia and Harjoto 
(2014) 
Percentage 
change of Sales  
Percentage 
change of 
employment  
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4. Further research in the venture capital field 
Articles published 
 Stranz, W., Lahmann, A. D. F., & Velamuri, V. (2016). Value creation in SME private 
equity buy-outs. Qualitative Research in Financial Market (Forthcoming). 
Articles in review process 
 Proksch, D., Stranz, W., & Pinkwart, A. (2016). German entrepreneurs in the high-
tech field: In whom should a venture capital company invest? International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business (Second review round). 
 
Conference articles 
 Proksch, D., Stranz, W., & Pinkwart, A. (2016, October). Risikomanagement in 
Venture Capital Finanzierungen: Eine qualitative Inhaltsanalyse von 
Geschäftsdokumenten. Paper presented at the 4th Annual Conference on Risk 
Governance, University of Siegen; Siegen, Germany, October 12-13. 
 Stranz, W., Lahmann, A. & Velamuri, V. (2016). Value Creation in SME Private 
Equity Buy-outs. Paper presented at the 20th Interdisciplinary Annual Conference on 
Entrepreneurship, Innovation and SME, G-Forum; Leipzig, Germany, October 5-7. 
 Lahmann, A., Proksch, D., & Stranz, W. (2016, October). Optimal use of milestones in 
venture capital financing — A barrier option model. Paper presented at the 20th 
Interdisciplinary Annual Conference on Entrepreneurship, Innovation and SME, G-
Forum; Leipzig, Germany, October 5-7. 
 Proksch, D., Stranz, W., & Pinkwart, A. (2016, October). The internationalization 
process of new technology and research-based ventures: Similarities and Differences. 
Paper presented at the 20th Interdisciplinary Annual Conference on Entrepreneurship, 
Innovation and SME, G-Forum; Leipzig, Germany, October 5-7. 
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